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INTRODUCTION 
Economic statecraft has long played an important role in international 
relations.1 During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, economic 
sanctions became one of the most frequently utilized means of carrying 
out United States foreign policy.2 Positioned somewhere between 
diplomacy and military engagement, sanctions are imposed to dissuade 
military adventures, impair military potential, destabilize foreign 
governments, and pursue both modest as well as major policy changes in 
target countries.3 The controversy over economic sanctions, however, is 
not a dispute about the ends sought; almost everyone agrees that 
promoting democracy and human rights, limiting nuclear proliferation, 
and deterring terrorism are good aims. Rather, the disagreement is about 
 
 
 1. DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1985). 
 2. Richard N. Haass, Sanctioning Madness, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 74 (1997). 
 3. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND 
CURRENT POLICY 4–9 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED]; see 
also infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.  
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whether economic sanctions are the most effective means to achieve some 
of these foreign policy ends. 
Further complicating the debate is the United States’ reliance on 
unilateral sanctions as its sanctions policy of choice in the post-Cold War 
era. Unilateral sanctions are attractive foreign policy tools because they 
represent non-military remedies for unacceptable behavior of foreign 
governments and offer immediate responses to domestic demands to “do 
something.”  
The U.S. use of unilateral sanctions to bring about transcendent 
changes (such as promoting human rights or restoring democracy) in 
target countries has only increased since the end of the Cold War.4 This is 
an alarming development given that the behavioral effects of economic 
sanctions on a target country remain unclear.5 This particular turn in 
sanctions policy adds another layer of complexity to questions about the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions and their corresponding political, 
economic, and social costs.  
A cursory glance at the literature on the efficacy of economic sanctions 
reveals the following consensus: although most analysts assert that 
economic sanctions are ineffective instruments of foreign policy,6 they 
disagree as to what factors determine whether economic sanctions are 
likely to be successful at promoting the foreign policy ends sought.7 What, 
then, is the proper framework—political, economic, social, legal, or 
humanitarian—to analyze the efficacy of unilateral sanctions in promoting 
democracy and human rights? To answer this question, this Article first 
 
 
 4. HOSSEIN G. ASKARI ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: EXAMINING THEIR PHILOSOPHY AND 
EFFICACY 1–3 (2003) (“[F]rom 1990 to 1998, the United States unilaterally imposed twelve sanctions 
. . .  [and] was party to thirty-six other sanctions as a coalition member.”); see also NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES 1993–1996 (1997) (stating that the United States imposed or 
threatened economic sanctions sixty-one times against thirty-five different nations, affecting forty-two 
percent of the world’s population).  
 5. See infra Part I of this Article for a more detailed discussion of the use of unilateral sanctions 
to promote foreign policy goals. 
 6. See BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 51 (“The two most salient characteristics of the literature on 
economic statecraft are scarcity and the nearly universal tendency to denigrate the utility of such tools 
of foreign policy.”); Robert Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SEC. 90, 93 (1997) 
(arguing that economic sanctions have been successful only on rare occasions); DANIEL W. DREZNER, 
THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9–21 (1999) 
(providing a more detailed analysis of the literature on economic sanctions).  
 7. Even the Hufbauer study, which is perhaps the most authoritative empirical study on the 
topic, uses only political and economic factors to predict the efficacy of the economic sanctions. See 
GRAY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: SUPPLEMENTAL CASE 
HISTORIES (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter HUFBAUER ET AL., SUPPLEMENT]. Additional legal, social, and 
humanitarian variables must be considered, depending on the unique context of each sanctions 
episode, so as to facilitate a more thorough analysis.  
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presents and critiques the analytical framework derived from Professor 
Gary Clyde Hufbauer’s empirical studies.8 The Article then supplements 
this framework with a list of additional episode-specific variables. Finally, 
the Article applies this new framework to analyze the U.S. comprehensive 
unilateral sanctions against the Union of Myanmar, formerly known as 
Burma.9 
Part I of the Article presents a general overview of the use of sanctions 
as economic statecraft. To narrow the scope of the sanctions analysis, I 
first distinguish sanctions accompanied by military action from those that 
are not, as well as unilateral from multilateral sanctions. My goal is to 
limit the analysis to the U.S. use of comprehensive unilateral sanctions to 
promote transcendent foreign policy goals in target countries—democracy 
and human rights in the case of Myanmar. Second, I survey the literature 
to provide a better understanding of the philosophy behind economic 
sanctions and to further examine the foreign policy goals sought by the 
sanctions, the sender’s motives, and the message sent by the sanctions. 
Last, I briefly describe U.S. unilateral sanctions practice by highlighting 
the relevant statutory measures and the types of sanctions typically 
imposed. 
Part II frames the U.S. unilateral sanctions policy analysis in the 
Burmese context. A thorough understanding of the domestic and 
international considerations of target countries—whether they are 
historical, political, economic, legal, social, or cultural—is indispensable 
to formulating, adopting, and implementing an effective sanctions policy. 
With this goal in mind, I attempt to illuminate the major events in 
Myanmar since its independence,10 concentrating especially on the 
 
 
 8. See HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 35–83; HUFBAUER ET 
AL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 7; Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Trade As a Weapon (Fred J. Hansen Inst. for 
World Peace, Working Paper, 1999); see also Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., U.S. Economic Sanctions: 
Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper, 1997).  
 9. The official English name for the country, as applied by the United Nations, is the “Union of 
Burma” for the period before 1989 and the “Union of Myanmar” after 1989. See Central Intelligence 
Agency, The World Factbook, Burma, available at http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/bm.html (last visited May 3, 2008). Setting symbolic overtures aside, the question of 
whether it was legitimate for the military regime to change the name of the country, or whether it is 
appropriate for certain powerful countries not to acknowledge the change, is not the most pressing of 
problems facing the people of Myanmar. Hence, these are discussions for another paper, if ever an 
opportunity should arise. For this Article, I will use Myanmar to refer to the country and Burmese to 
refer to its people. 
 10. Reconstruction of Myanmar’s post-independence history, due to a dearth of reliable and 
accurate sources, is a daunting task that deserves a treatment of its own. My brief account of the major 
developments in Myanmar is drawn from my studies while growing up in Myanmar, tainted perhaps 
with some socialist twist, and distilled from my many conversations with my grandfather, U Kyaw 
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democracy uprisings in 1988 and their aftermath, which brought about 
world-wide condemnation and subsequent sanctions from the United 
States. Part II goes on to describe the response to the human rights 
conditions in Myanmar, which is further divided into three realms: the 
international, regional, and U.S. response. The international response to 
the government in Myanmar spans from denunciations by the United 
Nations to suspension of financial assistance from the World Bank and the 
IMF.11 The regional response consists of mixed policies of sanctions and 
engagements, and, in some cases, total cooperation. The U.S. disapproval 
of human rights conditions in Myanmar culminated with the Burmese 
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003,12 which imposed comprehensive 
sanctions against the country. 
Part III of the Article begins the analysis of the political and economic 
variables that are regularly implicated in determining whether sanctions 
are likely to succeed. It starts by using the political and economic 
framework developed in the Hufbauer empirical study as a guidepost,13 
and then tests the conclusions drawn in the Hufbauer study in the context 
of the Myanmar sanctions. Confining the efficacy analysis to political and 
economic variables alone, however, is woefully inadequate. Thus, in Part 
IV, I suggest additional legal, social, and humanitarian variables that 
might better approximate the efficacy of the sanctions when considered in 
an episode-specific manner. 
This Article argues that the U.S. unilateral sanctions against Myanmar 
have been largely ineffectual and, more alarmingly, that the U.S. sanctions 
may have done more harm than good. Instead of ushering in a decade of 
political and economic change, the U.S. sanctions have frozen the existing 
political situation in place without providing the flexibility to develop 
creative solutions to break the political deadlock. The military government 
remains firmly entrenched while the economy languishes unreformed and 
unstable. Moreover, a decade of sanctions have imposed costs on the 
 
 
Nyun, who, at one time or another, was a finance minister, an ambassador, and an election commission 
member, but a career civil servant first and foremost.  
 11. See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
 12. Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, §§ 1–9, 117 Stat. 864 
(2003) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)). 
 13. See HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 39–40. The usual 
political suspects include the nature of the foreign policy goal sought, the presence of companion 
policy measures, the duration of the sanctions, the extent of the international cooperation, the presence 
of international assistance to the target country, the political and economic health of the target country, 
and prior relations between the sender and the target. Likewise, economic factors such as relative 
economic size, trade linkage, types of sanctions used, and costs on both sender and the target are 
usually assessed.  
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Myanmar civilian population, alienated the moderates within the military 
government, made harder any prospects of building a civil society that 
empowers people, and weakened the pro-democracy movement, making 
positive political change even less likely. 
An immediate reassessment of U.S. unilateral sanctions policy against 
Myanmar is needed because, while imposing their destructive costs on the 
people of Myanmar, the sanctions have failed to bring about meaningful 
change. Reassessment is especially necessary in light of the recent U.S. 
response—readily resorting to more sanctions and criticism in place of 
actual policy—to the Myanmar military government’s brutal crackdown 
on the peaceful demonstrations led by Buddhist monks. Likewise, the 
Myanmar regime’s bullish refusal in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis to 
allow U.S. personnel to assist in humanitarian relief efforts suggests its 
misplaced paranoia, the United States’ limited leverage over the regime, 
and how far relations between the two countries have deteriorated. Instead 
of feeling good about the existing sanctions, the United States must lead 
the international community in formulating a new approach grounded in 
diplomacy and dialogue, rebuild trust, and once again become an 
important player in helping to improve the standard of living of the 
Burmese people.  
I. SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 
The use of economic sanctions in international relations dates back to 
ancient Greece.14 In response to violations of sacred Athenian lands and 
the kidnapping of three Aspasian women, Pericles instituted the Megarian 
decree (432 BC), banning all trade between Megara and Athens and 
eventually leading to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.15 Since the 
Megarian decree, economic sanctions have come in various shapes and 
forms: the castle sieges of antiquity, Colonial America’s trade embargoes 
 
 
 14. See HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 4–5; see also ASKARI ET 
AL., supra note 4, at 5–8; DREZNER, supra note 6, at 6. 
 15. See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 73 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin 
Books 1972) (“In particular the delegates from Megara, after mentioning a number of other 
grievances, pointed out that, contrary to the terms of the treaty, they were excluded from all the ports 
in the Athenian empire and from the market of Athens itself.”). Because of Thucydides’ minor 
treatment of the decree in his accounts, historians disagree as to Pericles’ true motivations behind the 
decree. Some historians have interpreted the decree as a failed attempt at deterrence by Pericles to 
ward off a military conflict with Sparta, while others have suggested that Pericles intended to punish 
Megara for its support of Corinth, which was an ally of Sparta. Nevertheless, both factions agree that 
the Megarian decree was a critical development in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. For a 
detailed discussion of Pericles’ motivations behind the Megarian decree, see ASKARI ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 5–7.  
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against Britain, and naval blockades during the American Civil War.16 
Sanctions episodes before the Cold War were invariably linked to military 
conflict; economic sanctions served as either prologues to or compliments 
of warfare-related measures.17 During the Cold War and its aftermath, 
however, economic sanctions have been transformed into a stand-alone 
policy that resides somewhere between diplomacy and military action.18  
Many questions must be addressed to analyze the efficacy of unilateral 
sanctions in promoting transcendent goals: What is an economic sanction? 
What is the difference between unilateral and multilateral sanctions? Why 
are sanctions used? What are the various types of sanctions? What is the 
U.S. unilateral sanctions practice?  
First, it is critical to come to a consensus on a clear definition of 
economic sanctions, because a second-level inquiry into the effectiveness 
of a sanctions episode depends on the scope of the definition used. For 
instance, it may be inappropriate to include sanctions that are used in 
concert with military action when defining economic sanctions because 
the success or failure of this type of sanctions may ultimately depend on 
the military outcome. 
Second, unilateral sanctions must be distinguished from multilateral 
sanctions, keeping in mind that “more is not necessarily merrier.”19 
Moreover, economic interdependence between nations, rather than a strict 
unilateral/multilateral distinction, may play a more prominent role in 
determining the efficacy of a particular sanctions episode. 
Third, when answering the question of why unilateral sanctions are 
instituted widely, it is essential to understand the theory behind economic 
 
 
 16. For a perspective on the historical uses of economic sanctions, see ASKARI ET AL., supra note 
4, at 4–13; see also GEOFF SIMONS, IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LEGAL REMEDY OR 
GENOCIDAL TOOL? (1999). 
 17. ASKARI ET AL., supra note 4, at 14 (indicating that all the historical sanctions episodes 
analyzed in their study were associated with a military conflict); see also HUFBAUER ET AL., 
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 5 (pointing out that most of the sanctions episodes prior 
to World War I “foreshadowed or accompanied warfare”).  
 18. See Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury, Sanctions As Economic Statecraft: An Overview, in 
SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury 
eds., 2000) (“Economic statecraft offers an appealing substitute to military force given a general 
reluctance to resort to war due to its destructive and possibly counter-productive [sic] consequences.”); 
HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 4–9 (tracing the historical evolution of 
the use of economic sanctions); see also ASKARI ET AL., supra note 4, at 29 (“A strict concern with the 
separation of economic sanctions from the involvement of military actions might be correlated with 
the Cold War mentality and the concern that even the slightest military provocation could eventually 
escalate to a full-blown nuclear assault.”). 
 19. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 95 (“In general, the greater 
the number of countries needed to implement sanctions, the less likely it is that they will be 
effective.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD 463 
 
 
 
 
sanctions in general and the attractiveness of unilateral sanctions in 
particular, as well as unintended consequences that are normally not taken 
into consideration. The underlying assumption that economic hardship will 
lead to political change in a target country is unreasonable in many 
situations because of tenuous links between cause and effect.  
Fourth, the unique nature of each sanctions episode,20 as well as the 
different forms of sanctions that are traditionally employed,21 need careful 
consideration. Symbolic sanctions, instituted for the sake of doing 
something, may make the constituents in the sender country feel good, but 
may not actually do any good in the target country. Worse even, they may 
unintentionally harm the general population in the target country.  
Last, the major statutory and regulatory programs in the U.S. unilateral 
sanctions arsenal require a brief investigation.  
A. Economic Sanctions Defined and Distinguished 
Two observations compel our inquiry to define economic sanctions and 
to classify various forms among them. First, the end of the Cold War 
sparked a proliferation in the use of economic sanctions. During this 
period, the United States has played a leading role in employing 
sanctions—both unilateral and multilateral—to achieve its foreign policy 
goals.22 Furthermore, the imposition of economic sanctions against weaker 
nations whose policies are adverse to U.S. interests will most likely 
increase in the future, especially considering the costs of military 
intervention.23 Second, there is disconnect between the historical and 
modern conceptions of economic sanctions. The commonly accepted 
notion that economic sanctions lie somewhere between diplomacy and 
military engagement is a modern concept. Historical use of economic 
sanctions, on the other hand, “foreshadowed or accompanied warfare.”24 
 
 
 20. The characteristics that make each sanctions episode unique depend primarily on the foreign 
policy goals sought, the motive behind the sanctions, and message sent by the sanctions. See 
HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 6–12. 
 21. Id. at 36–38. “There are three main ways in which a sender country tries to inflict costs on its 
target: by limiting exports, by restricting imports, and by impeding finance, including the reduction of 
aid.” Id. at 36. 
 22. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also James Schlesinger, Fragmentation and 
Hubris, 49 NAT’L INT. 3, 8 (1997).  
 23. See DREZNER, supra note 6, at 7 (“What is noteworthy . . . is not just the frequency with 
which sanctions are used but their centrality; economic sanctions are increasingly at the core of U.S. 
foreign policy.” (citing Haass, supra note 2, at 74) (omission in original)). For a detailed discussion on 
changing U.S. interests and post-Cold War trends in the use of sanctions, see MEGHAN L. 
O’SULLIVAN, SHREWD SANCTIONS: STATECRAFT AND STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM 11–35 (2003). 
 24. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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Due to these observations, it is necessary to better understand how 
economic sanctions work. 
1. Economic Sanctions Defined 
Economic sanctions can be defined, depending on the particular role 
one would like sanctions to play in international affairs, in two different 
ways. Economic sanctions can either encompass every measure designed 
to inflict economic deprivation or include only the most comprehensive of 
embargoes imposed for well-defined political reasons. A broad definition 
based solely on the ends would take into consideration only the economic 
deprivation inflicted upon a target country, and not the means employed to 
bring about that deprivation. As a result, any measure—economic or 
military—that disrupts the economic activity of an adversary would 
qualify as an economic sanction. Conversely, a definition based on the 
means, which is commonly accepted today, narrows the scope of what 
constitutes economic sanctions by focusing only on trade-disrupting 
measures. Hufbauer and colleagues define economic sanctions as “the 
deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of 
customary trade or financial relations.”25 
A further synthesis of the literature reveals the following definition, 
which will be used for this Article: economic sanctions are the actual or 
threatened withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations, imposed by 
the sender against the target, for foreign policy purposes.26 Under this 
approach, economic sanctions are limited to restrictions on trade, 
investment, and other cross-border economic activity that reduce the target 
country’s revenues, thereby facilitating the desired change without 
resorting to military action. Because one of the primary rationales behind 
economic sanctions is to avoid military conflict altogether, measures that 
are used in concert with military engagement are not considered economic 
sanctions under this definition.27 Likewise, diplomatic protests and 
 
 
 25. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that customary 
means “levels of trade and financial activity that would probably have occurred in the absence of 
sanctions”).  
 26. Id.; see ASKARI ET AL., supra note 4, at 14 (“Economic sanctions are coercive measures 
imposed by one country, or coalition of countries, against another country, its government or 
individual entities therein, to bring about a change in behavior or policies.” (quoting DIANNE E. 
RENNACK & ROBERT D. SHUEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: 
DISCUSSION AND GUIDE TO CURRENT LAW (1998)); see also Chan & Drury, supra note 18, at 2–3 
(sanctions are defined as “the actual or threatened withdrawal of economic resources to effect policy 
change by the target”).  
 27. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
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economic coercions that are meant to obtain general leverage in trade 
negotiations are not economic sanctions. In addition, threatened or actual 
retaliations within the international trading system that are undertaken in 
the course of trade disputes are outside the parameters of economic 
sanctions. The reduction and suspension of economic aid and other trade 
preferences, depending on whether they are considered “carrots” or 
“sticks,” can sometimes be within the confines of economic sanctions.28  
2. Unilateral and Multilateral Sanctions Distinguished 
Sanctions nomenclature classifies the country or coalition of countries 
imposing the sanctions as the “sender,” while the country subjected to 
economic sanctions is designated as the “target.”29 In addition, sanctions 
episodes are divided into two categories: unilateral and multilateral. The 
distinction between unilateral and multilateral sanctions is based solely on 
the number of senders participating in a given sanctions episode. 
Multilateral sanctions are imposed by more than one country and enjoy 
international support; unilateral sanctions, on the other hand, are imposed 
by a country acting alone, or almost alone, in applying the sanctions.30 
While most contemporary analysts agree that unilateral sanctions—
even when wielded by the United States—are ineffective tools in 
compelling target countries to change their policies,31 the debate over the 
efficacy of multilateral sanctions has yielded conflicting conclusions. 
Hufbauer and colleagues, drawing from their case studies, argue that “the 
greater the number of countries needed to implement sanctions, the less 
likely it is that they will be effective.”32 Some analysts, on the other hand, 
maintain that multilateral sanctions are more likely to succeed than 
 
 
 28. See ERNEST H. PREEG, FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD WITH SANCTIONS: UNILATERAL 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST 216 (1999) (stating that the reason why 
reduction of financial assistance to target country governments is not considered economic sanctions is 
because economic aid is a positive incentive—or “carrot”—and thus an alternative to the punitive 
“stick” of sanctions on normal commerce); see also HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, 
supra note 3, at 2. 
 29. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 35–36. 
 30. ASKARI ET AL., supra note 4, at 31 (“People who study economic sanctions have become 
comfortable with dividing sanctions into two basic categories: unilateral and multilateral. The 
distinction is made according to the number of entities participating in the sanction. When only one 
entity . . . is imposing an economic sanction, it is labeled unilateral; all others are multilateral.”).  
 31. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also PREEG, supra note 28, at 7–10. 
 32. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 95; see also Daniel Drezner, 
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 
INT’L ORG. 73, 73 (2000) (arguing that there is no correlation, or even a negative correlation, between 
multilateral sanctions and their success). 
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unilateral sanctions.33 This apparent controversy over the efficacy of 
multilateral sanctions can be attributed to our common sense conclusions, 
which mislead us into thinking that multilateral sanctions, by garnering 
greater participation and wider international support, ought to be more 
successful than their unilateral counterparts. 
It is natural to expect multilateral sanctions to succeed where unilateral 
sanctions have failed, since, by definition, they involve many nations 
ganging up to impose their will on a target country. Nevertheless, 
economic interdependence between nations, brought about by 
globalization and technological advancement, may have rendered 
multilateral sanctions more symbolic than effective. When determining the 
efficacy of a particular sanctions episode, the critical question is not the 
total number of senders, but the identities of the senders and the non-
senders and their respective present and future economic relationships 
with the target. This Article is concerned with the efficacy of unilateral 
sanctions and, as such, leaves the multilateral sanctions debate to others.  
B. Unilateral Sanctions As a Tool for Foreign Policy 
The United States has employed unilateral sanctions frequently since 
the end of the Cold War.34 The attractiveness of unilateral sanctions, 
despite their divided reputation for effectiveness, can be traced to a 
number of factors. First, unilateral sanctions, and economic sanctions in 
general, represent a substitute for war.35 Despite the benefits accrued from 
the avoidance of a military conflict, however, the civilian population of the 
target state still suffers the consequences of sanctions, which can create a 
humanitarian backlash in or against the sender country.36 Second, 
unilateral sanctions provide the sender with a means to express concern 
and moral outrage against unacceptable behavior of foreign 
 
 
 33. See DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN 
STRATEGIES IN THE 1990S 204–08 (2000) (arguing that multilateral sanctions are the primary means by 
which the United Nations and its member countries can respond to a breach of the UN Charter 
obligations and that there are successful outcomes among the supposed failures that are widely 
publicized); see also PREEG, supra note 28, at 8 (asserting that multilateral sanctions inflict a greater 
economic hardship on the target country than unilateral sanctions). 
 34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 35. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 36. Joseph J. Collins & Gabrielle D. Bowdoin, Beyond Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Better 
Alternatives for U.S. Foreign Policy, CSIS REP. 1, 8 (Mar. 1999) (discussing the resulting political 
costs in the United States as well as in the coalition countries stemming from the detailed accounts 
given by Denis Halliday, coordinator of the UN oil-for-food program in Iraq, who attributes the 
terrible toll exacted on the Iraqi civilian population to the U.S.-led sanctions). 
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governments.37 Likewise, unilateral sanctions allow politicians to respond 
to domestic pressures from advocacy groups without the risk of incurring 
political costs in the future. Last, imposition of unilateral sanctions is not 
“constrained by the need to reach prior international agreement, as is the 
case for multilateral sanctions.”38 
1. The Logic Behind Unilateral Sanctions Policy 
The imposition of economic sanctions is designed to compel a behavior 
or policy change in a target country by inducing economic losses. The 
causal theory behind economic sanctions is rather straightforward. 
Restrictions on normal trade relations, foreign direct investment, and 
development assistance are intended to inflict economic loss on a target 
country.39 In turn, severe hardship brought about by these economic losses 
will then foster political discontent among the population in the target 
country.40 One desired outcome is that the civilian population in the target 
country will rise up against its leaders to demand change, forcing the 
target government to reverse its objectionable behavior and policies.41 
Alternatively, the leaders in the target country, after realizing the error of 
their ways, will acquiesce to the outside demands and change their 
behavior and policies.42 
However, the causal relationship between economic loss and political 
change is subject to a number of potential derailments. First, it is not clear 
how sanctions would work if the civilian population in a target country 
does not have the capacity to rise up against the government. For example, 
the target population’s ability to effect change will be much different in a 
repressive dictatorship than in a democracy. A population that lives in fear 
under a military dictatorship is less likely to rise up and demand political 
change. Second, often little thought is given to the alternatives available 
when a particular target government is not accountable to its citizens, does 
not take into consideration the welfare of all or a majority of its people, or 
“bunkers down” in the name of national security. The assumption that 
every leader in every target country is accountable to its constituents is 
little more than wishful thinking in a totalitarian state. Last, the link 
 
 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. See PREEG, supra note 28, at 1. 
 39. See ASKARI ET AL., supra note 4, at 68–69. 
 40. Id. at 69. 
 41. Id.; see also Joy Fausey, Does the United Nations’ Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect 
Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 193, 197–99 (1994). 
 42. Fausey, supra note 41, at 199. 
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between economic loss and political change is closely coupled with 
democratic ideals, which are absent in the politics of a dictatorial regime. 
2. Foreign Policy Goals and Motivations Behind the Sanctions 
The United States has often imposed unilateral sanctions, or 
participated in multilateral sanctions, to promote a range of foreign policy 
objectives, including the disruption of military adventures,43 the 
impairment of military potential,44 and the destabilization of foreign 
governments.45 In addition, sanctions have been employed to stop nuclear 
proliferation, promote democracy, protect human rights, combat 
international terrorism, battle drug trafficking, and settle expropriation 
claims.46 Similarly, the motivations behind each sanctions episode range 
from punishment to deterrence to symbolic demonstrations of moral 
outrage.47 For purposes of this Article, I limit my analysis to the use of 
comprehensive unilateral sanctions by the United States to promote 
democracy and protect human rights in Myanmar.  
 
 
 43. See HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 5–6, for a general 
description of the use of economic sanctions to discourage military adventures. See also id. at 163 
(Case 80-1: U.S. v. USSR—the grain embargo and the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics did not 
discourage Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, highlighting the inability of one major power to deter the 
military adventure of another major power); HUFBAUER ET AL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 243 
(Case 63-1: U.S. v. United Arab Republic—U.S. withholding of development and food aid caused 
Egypt to withdraw its troops from Yemen and the Congo). 
 44. See HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 6, for a general 
description of the use of economic sanctions to “impair the economic capability of the target country, 
thereby limiting its potential for military activity.” Id. at 125 (Case 48-5: U.S. and COCOM v. USSR 
and COMECON—U.S. instituted an embargo on the export of a wide range of strategic goods to the 
Soviet Union). 
 45. Id. at 6–7 (describing generally the use of economic sanctions to destabilize foreign 
governments, normally involving a major power against a small country); see also HUFBAUER ET AL., 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 182 (Case 60-1: U.S. v. Dominican Republic—Trujillo); id. at 194 
(Case 60-3: U.S. v. Cuba—Castro); id. at 220 (Case 62-1: U.S. v. Brazil—Goulart), and id. at 314 
(Case 77-1: U.S. v. Chile—Allende), for a detailed analysis of U.S. involvement in destabilization 
cases against its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere).  
 46. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 7–8 (providing a general 
description of the use of economic sanctions to advance major and minor policy changes in target 
countries); id. at 192 (Case 82-1: U.S. v. Poland—sanctions to promote political liberalization in 
Poland); HUFBAUER ET AL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 8, at 221 (Case 85-1: U.S. v. South Africa—
sanctions to end the South African policy of apartheid); see also id. at 340 (Case 73-1: Arab League v. 
U.S. and Netherlands—Arab League boycott over the target countries’ support of Israel); id. at 625 
(Case 89-1: India v. Nepal—India’s desire to reverse the brief pro-China line of the Nepalese 
government).  
 47. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 11 (“[T]he imposition of 
sanctions conveys a triple signal: to the target country it says the sender does not condone your 
actions; to allies it says that words will be supported with deeds; to domestic audiences it says the 
sender’s government will act to safeguard the nation’s vital interests.”). 
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C. U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Practice 
The U.S. unilateral sanctions programs prohibit U.S. persons, and 
sometimes foreign entities controlled by U.S. firms, from conducting 
business and financial dealings with target countries, the governments of 
those countries, or entities controlled by those governments.48 The 
prohibitions contained in the unilateral sanctions programs can be broadly 
categorized into two interconnected components: trade restrictions and 
financial restrictions. Trade restrictions consist of export controls, import 
controls, and denial of certain trade preferences.49 Financial restrictions, 
on the other hand, include freezing the target country’s foreign assets, 
banning foreign investment, and withdrawing foreign development and 
security assistance.50 Most unilateral sanctions programs involve some 
combination of trade and financial restrictions. The sanctions are either 
partial or comprehensive, depending on the extent to which trade and 
financial relations with the target country are cut off.  
Authority to impose unilateral sanctions is vested in the executive and 
legislative branches of the U.S. government. Under the executive powers, 
unilateral sanctions programs carried out by the United States are 
instituted pursuant to Presidential Executive Orders under several 
statutes.51 Prior to 1977, unilateral sanctions programs were exercised 
under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, which now may be 
invoked only during a congressionally declared war.52 The current 
sanctions programs, however, derive their authority from the International 
 
 
 48. John L. Ellicott, Update on U.S. Foreign Trade Controls: Export Controls and Economic 
Sanctions, Outline for Remarks Before the Greater Cleveland International Lawyers Group 4 (Nov. 9, 
2004) (on file with author). 
 49. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 36–37 (discussing the 
general preference for export controls over import controls); see The Export Administration Act 
(EAA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–2420 (1988); see also Ellicott, supra note 48, at 2–3 (discussing the 
administration of export controls through the President’s national emergency authority under the 
IEEPA even though the EAA has lapsed since 1994); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and 
U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 43–46 (2001) (highlighting the role withdrawal of 
import preferences plays in promoting labor and human rights abroad).  
 50. See HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 37–38 (“Target 
countries are often hurt through the interruption of commercial and official finance . . . . The ultimate 
form of financial and trade control is a freeze of the target country’s foreign assets, such as bank 
accounts held in the sender country.”); see also Cleveland, supra note 49, at 38–41 (citing specific 
cases in which bans on foreign investment and denials of development aid were imposed to promote 
human rights). 
 51. Ellicott, supra note 48, at 5. See Cleveland, supra note 49, at 31–37, for a detailed account of 
the statutory definitions and design of the federal statutes implicated in imposing unilateral sanctions. 
 52. Ellicott, supra note 48, at 5; see also Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) 
(1994). 
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Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).53 The IEEPA 
empowers the president to declare a national emergency and subsequently 
to impose broad economic sanctions if the President determines that “any 
unusual and extraordinary threat [exists] to the national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States.”54 Finally, unilateral sanctions 
can also be instituted pursuant to congressional enactment of special 
legislation authorizing or directing specific sanctions programs.55 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND MILITARY RULE IN MYANMAR 
In order to properly frame the U.S. unilateral sanctions policy against 
the military government of Myanmar, it is critical to understand 
Myanmar’s domestic and international tensions, as well as the course of 
events that culminated in the imposition of comprehensive sanctions by 
the United States. At first glance, the Burmese sanctions seem to pit the 
democratic forces of change against a brutal regime unwilling to relinquish 
its grip on power. Another look, however, reveals an ill-considered 
attempt by the United States to force a democratic transition in Myanmar 
without a thorough assessment of Myanmar’s historical, political, 
economic, social, and cultural climate.56 By unraveling this collision of 
opposing viewpoints, this Article attempts to better illuminate the 
historical and societal conditions that helped shape Myanmar’s political 
deadlock, provide structure to the sanctions analysis, and consider the 
prospects for a reconciliatory future. Most importantly, creative solutions 
to overcome the potentially tragic consequences facing the people of 
Myanmar, arising either from the continuation of sanctions or other 
factors, must begin with an attempt to understand the forces responsible 
for bringing Myanmar to its current predicament. 
However, a detailed rendition of Myanmar history since its 
independence, though invaluable in providing insight into the historical 
and political situation in Myanmar, is beyond the scope of this Article.57 
 
 
 53. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626 
(1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2000)) [hereinafter IEEPA]; see also Ellicott, supra note 
48, at 5. 
 54. IEEPA, §§ 1701, 1702(b). 
 55. Ellicott, supra note 48, at 5. For example, the most recent set of comprehensive sanctions 
against Myanmar were founded on the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. Id. 
 56. PREEG, supra note 28, at 111–46. 
 57. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. For a brief overview of Myanmar history, see 
Robert H. Taylor, Pathways to the Present, in MYANMAR: BEYOND POLITICS TO SOCIETAL 
IMPERATIVES 1 (Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter Taylor, Pathways]. For a more detailed analysis of Myanmar history, see D.G.E. HALL, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/3
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Instead, the Article highlights the major events that have shaped Myanmar 
since its independence, the role of the military in Myanmar politics, and 
the prospects for a democratic future in Myanmar. This brief snapshot of 
the political events in Myanmar will help to facilitate an understanding of 
human rights in Myanmar during the pro-democracy uprisings of 1988 and 
its aftermath. Then the Article measures the U.S. response to human rights 
inadequacies in Myanmar against international, regional, and country-
specific responses in an attempt to further determine their exact contours 
and effectiveness. Only then can we implement the most effective means 
to help the people of Myanmar “to make a transition from an isolated and 
highly repressive military regime toward the beginnings of a market-
oriented democracy.”58  
A. A Brief Perspective on Myanmar 
Two developments define modern Myanmar: (1) the inability to 
resolve political and economic challenges faced at the time of 
independence, and (2) the rise of the military (the Tatmadaw) from the 
civil chaos as a state-building institution that forcefully asserts the power 
of the central state. Robert Taylor, a Myanmar scholar, argues that 
Myanmar has tried tragically to fit a myriad of policy prescriptions, 
“encapsulated in the most popular ideology of the day” to tackle its many 
societal challenges.59 Not only did these popularisms for change fail to 
 
 
BURMA (1950); MAUNG HTIN AUNG, THE STRICKEN PEACOCK: ANGLO-BURMESE RELATIONS 1752–
1948 (1965); DONALD SMITH, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN BURMA (1965); JOHN F. CADY, A HISTORY 
OF MODERN BURMA (1958); JOSEF SILVERSTEIN, BURMA: MILITARY RULE AND THE POLITICS OF 
STAGNATION (1977); ROBERT H. TAYLOR, THE STATE IN BURMA (1987); THANT MYINT-U, THE 
MAKING OF MODERN BURMA (2001); and THANT MYINT-U, THE RIVER OF LOST FOOTSTEPS (2006).  
 58. PREEG, supra note 28, at 111. It is hard to predict with reasonable certainty the type of 
civilian rule Myanmar will enjoy in the future or when this change will begin. However, most 
international critics agree that a transition toward anything resembling a democratic civilian rule will 
take time because Myanmar must first address many complex and critical issues that have been 
neglected during the past sixty years. See Taylor, Pathways, supra note 57, at 1 (“The issues which 
today concern the citizens of Myanmar are rooted in the country’s complex and often contested 
institutions and history. Those who perceive their solutions as simple, and to be solved quickly by the 
mere introduction of democratically elected civilian rule, are in danger of deluding themselves. 
Without attempting to understand how Myanmar came to its current condition, simplistically proffered 
recipes for change, democratic or authoritarian, are as likely to result in failure as success.”).  
 59. Taylor, Pathways, supra note 57, at 1 (“Indeed, it can be argued that [Myanmar’s] condition 
now is the result of often well-meaning but ultimately foolhardy attempts to apply currently popular 
political solutions, encapsulated in the most popular ideology of the day, to Myanmar’s myriad 
societal imperatives. ‘Nationalism’, ‘socialism’, and ‘autarky’, just as ‘federalism’, ‘autonomy’, and 
‘centralization’, have all had their day as policy prescriptions in post-colonial Myanmar . . . . Those 
that have come to be implemented have often persisted long after they demonstrated their 
inappropriateness.”).  
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resolve the critical issues of the past, but they also lingered beyond their 
usefulness and left a legacy of stasis and mismanagement that threatens to 
derail future prospects for change.60 It is critical that new approaches to 
solve present day societal problems in Myanmar tackle, understand, and 
overcome political and economic challenges of the past. 
Likewise, any solution leading to political and civil change in 
Myanmar must take into account the embedded role of the Tatmadaw in 
Myanmar politics. Mary Callahan argues that warfare and civil strife in 
postcolonial Myanmar created conditions under which the Tatmadaw 
secured its authority over nonmilitary affairs and consolidated its 
stranglehold over the power of the central state.61 The Tatmadaw’s 
paternalistic attitude in managing the country was fueled by its distrust of 
foreign elements, reaction to threats against national security, and constant 
struggle for national unity. Conditioned by their education and experience 
to be “war fighters who are not adept at politics,” the generals running the 
regime, unlike civilian politicians who are accountable to the public, will 
choose to defy international condemnation despite the costs involved.62  
Proper efficacy analysis of the U.S. unilateral sanctions must actively 
incorporate factors that have shaped Myanmar’s current condition and 
political life. To this end, historical and political events giving rise to 
Myanmar’s current situation are classified into three periods. Immediately 
following its independence from the British Empire, Myanmar’s political 
landscape was marked by a brief experiment with participatory 
governance and democratic rule. This initial period was followed by 
twenty-six years of economic failure and self-imposed isolation under the 
direction of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). Most recently, the 
military junta in power today has been promising to make a transition to a 
market-oriented democracy since the crackdown of the pro-democracy 
movement nearly two decades ago. 
 
 
 60. Id. at 25 (“[Myanmar] is the only major country which appears nearly six decades after 
independence not to have yet resolved the consequences of its past in order to build a more prosperous 
and open society for its people. The legacy of civil war, separatism, ideological conflicts, socialism, 
underinvestment, inadequate infrastructure, and other consequences of an overemphasis on security 
have created a poverty stricken society in crisis in terms of health and educational provision.”). 
 61. MARY P. CALLAHAN, MAKING ENEMIES: WAR AND STATE BUILDING IN BURMA, 2, 173 
(1999) [hereinafter CALLAHAN, MAKING ENEMIES]. 
 62. Id. at 2 (“[T]he tatmadaw is not a ‘political movement in military garb.’ Instead, the soldiers 
. . . as well as the generals running the regime over the last several decades, are war fighters who are 
not adept at politics. But they are war fighters, first and foremost . . . . Unless seen in the light of its 
war-fighting focus, the Burmese tatmadaw looks like an incomparably efficient team of power-hungry, 
illiterate, shameless, vicious lunatics.”). 
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1. 1948–1962: Nationalism and Roots of Democracy 
Myanmar gained its independence from British colonial rule on 
January 4, 1948, and then began its initial experiment with parliamentary 
government. However, General Aung San, who was the unquestioned 
leader of the independence movement, an astute political strategist, and the 
father of both the Myanmar Tatmadaw and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was 
assassinated prior to Myanmar’s independence.63 Contemporary pro-
democracy activists label this period from 1948 to 1962 (excluding the 
military caretaker government from 1958 to 1960) as Myanmar’s 
“democratic era.”64 According to this view, the 1950s represented 
Myanmar’s period of constitutionalism, civilian rule, contested elections, 
and parliamentary process.65 Supporters of the authoritarian rule, on the 
other hand, insist that the 1950s was a period of internal instability, failed 
economic policies, corruption, and widespread anarchy.66 
The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) (the former 
wartime resistance organization turned political party led by Prime 
Minister U Nu), controlled the political arena and was victorious in the 
parliamentary elections of 1947, 1951, and 1956.67 The collapse of the 
AFPFL produced a military caretaker government between 1958 and 
1960, which culminated in U Nu’s faction winning the 1960 elections over 
the military-supported faction.68 More importantly, the military rose from 
the chaos of mutinies and defections, separatist movements by various 
ethnic groups, and the insurgency movement of the Burmese Communist 
Party (BCP) to become a dominant political force.69 Blaming the elected 
 
 
 63. General Aung San, the leader of the famed “Thirty Comrades” and President of the Anti-
Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), is generally considered as the person who held together 
various nationalistic elements into a single state. He was assassinated during an executive council 
meeting on July 19, 1947, together with six other cabinet members and two bodyguards. For additional 
information on General Aung San, see MAUNG MAUNG, AUNG SAN OF BURMA (1962); AUNG SAN 
SUU KYI, AUNG SAN OF BURMA: A BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT BY HIS DAUGHTER (2d ed. 1995).  
 64. For a detailed account of Burmese politics in the 1950s, see Mary P. Callahan, On Time 
Warps and Warped Time: Lessons from Burma’s “Democratic Era,” in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A 
DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 49 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 1998) [hereinafter Callahan, Time Warps]; see also U 
NU, TOWARDS PEACE AND DEMOCRACY (1949) (selected translated speeches from the 1940s of then 
Burmese Prime Minister Hon’ble Thakin Nu); U NU, FROM PEACE TO STABILITY (1951); U NU, 
BURMA LOOKS AHEAD (1953); U NU, FORWARD WITH THE PEOPLE (1955).  
 65. Callahan, Time Warps, supra note 64, at 57–58. 
 66. Id. at 58.  
 67. Id. at 51; see HUGH TINKER, THE UNION OF BURMA: A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS OF 
INDEPENDENCE 18, 62 (1967); see also U SAN NYEIN & MYINT KYI, MYANMAR POLITICS FROM 1958–
1962 (1991) (in Burmese). 
 68. See PREEG, supra note 28, at 112; see also Callahan, Time Warps, supra note 64, at 51.  
 69. Callahan, Time Warps, supra note 64, at 59–60; see also Callahan, Making Enemies, supra 
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government’s inability to deal with internal security threats, the 
Revolutionary Council headed by General Ne Win usurped power on 
March 2, 1962, and established the Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar.70  
2. 1962–1988: The Burmese Way of Socialism 
With the goal of creating a unified and strong Myanmar, U Ne Win’s 
brand of socialism was perpetuated through a one party system—the 
BSPP.71 Like many other newly independent nations that discarded their 
neo-colonial underpinnings of Western capitalism, Myanmar, under the 
control of the BSPP, incorporated socialist ideas and values into its 
political ideology, though cloaked in the language of Buddhism and 
references to its pre-colonial heritage.72 The BSPP argued that ending 
disunity among various ethnic groups and developing a national culture 
based on traditional Burmese values and ideals would lead to the creation 
of a unified and strong Myanmar.73 The BSPP further insisted that only a 
unified and strong Myanmar would be able to resist alien ideas and values 
from abroad, which were destroying the fabric of the Burmese culture.74 
To this end, Myanmar isolated itself from the international community for 
twenty-six years. 
The Burmese way of socialism was a tragic failure. Although 
considerable success was achieved in suppressing the insurgency by ethnic 
minorities and the BCP, the shortcomings far outweighed these triumphs.75 
The self-imposed isolation from the world community had cut off 
international trade as well as other social contacts with the outside world.76 
 
 
note 61, at 114–71.  
 70. Taylor, Pathways, supra note 57, at 16–21. 
 71. Id. 
 72. For an account of Burmese political culture, see Josef Silverstein, The Evolution and Salience 
of Myanmar’s National Political Culture, in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 11 
(Robert I. Rothberg ed., 1998) [hereinafter Silverstein, Evolution]. For a discussion of the 
incorporation of Buddhism into the Burmese version of socialism and a retracing of the roots of the 
political conflict in Myanmar, see R. H. Taylor, Political Values and Political Conflict in Myanmar, in 
BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 33 (Robert I. Rothberg ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
Taylor, Political Values].  
 73. For the basis of these ideas, see the basic ideological text of the BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM 
PARTY (BSPP), THE SYSTEM OF THE CORRELATION OF MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAMME PARTY (1963), available at http://www. 
burmalibrary.org/docs/System-of-correlation.htm.  
 74. Id. 
 75. See PREEG, supra note 28, at 113.  
 76. Other detrimental aspects of the BSPP’s isolationist policies include the exodus of educated 
Burmese from the country and the stoppage of the flow of ideas that accompany trade. For additional 
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Incompetent officials ran the newly created state enterprises to the ground, 
while economic mismanagement, inflation, and demonetization left the 
country’s economy in ruins.77 Even more, corruption and cronyism had 
slowly chipped away at the Burmese spirit and character. By 1987, 
Myanmar was declared a least-developed country by the United Nations at 
its own request.78 The decreased standard of living and the government’s 
failure to provide necessary infrastructure, goods, and social services 
compelled the normally docile population to stage peaceful 
demonstrations during the long summer of 1988. 
3. 1988–Present: Clash of Ideologies and Political Impasse 
The events that occurred between March and September of 1988 
refocused the world’s attention on Myanmar. On August 8, 1988, students, 
monks, government employees, and civilians from all walks of life took to 
the streets and peacefully marched for change. They were gunned down. 
As many as three thousand people were killed on the streets; many more 
would later die in prisons and at the border regions from malaria.79 During 
the pro-democracy demonstrations of 1988, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the 
daughter of General Aung San, emerged as the figurehead and voice of the 
democratic movement. However, on September 18, 1988, the Myanmar 
Tatmadaw, later named the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC),80 violently suppressed the pro-democracy movement, put Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, imposed martial law, and assumed 
command.81 
Faced with both domestic and world-wide criticism of its violent 
usurpation of power, SLORC promised to hold national elections to 
reconstitute the general assembly as the first step in restoring democracy.82 
 
 
information on the linkage between flow of trade and exchange of ideas, see DANI RODRIK, THE NEW 
GLOBAL ECONOMY AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING OPENNESS WORK (1999). 
 77. PREEG, supra note 28, at 113. 
 78. John B. Haseman, Burma in 1987: Change in the Air?, 28 ASIAN SURVEY 223, 223–28 
(1988).  
 79. It is almost impossible to correctly determine the true extent of the crackdown and estimates 
vary depending on the political viewpoint one is attempting to advance.  
 80. At the time when it installed itself in power, the military junta was known as the SLORC. In 
December 1997, the SLORC was dissolved and the State Peace and the Development Council (SPDC) 
was created, composed of many of the same generals. I will use SLORC and SPDC interchangeably in 
the Article because they are one and the same.  
 81. Recycling the justifications of the 1962 coup, the military junta declared that the nation was 
confronted with political disunity, threats to national sovereignty, and the dissolution of the state. For a 
more detailed account, see Taylor, Pathways, supra note 57, at 21–25. 
 82. Id. at 22. 
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However, SLORC nullified the results of the 1990 national election, in 
which Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition party, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD), overwhelmingly defeated the military-backed National 
Unity Party (NUP) by winning over sixty percent of the vote and 392 of 
the 485 assembly seats, compared to ten for the NUP.83  
The political impasse between the NLD and SLORC stems from a 
clash of deeply rooted values—modern political ideology versus 
traditional values of the Burmese society. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
NLD called for democracy, freedom, and a government of law.84 The 
military leaders, however, have been “conditioned by education and career 
experience to reject such values as not only foreign, but actually 
subversive of the nation they have pledged to defend.”85  
The enduring military dominance in Myanmar politics has resulted in a 
dual system of governance in Myanmar; “[o]ne limp structure of 
governance lay in the civilian realm, the other more robust structure lay in 
the military bureaucracy.”86 Those who are affiliated with the military 
enjoy a different set of privileges than those who are not.87 Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi has been placed under house arrest numerous times and has 
remained in captivity since May 2003.88 Many other pro-democracy 
advocates associated with the NLD have been detained as well.89 There 
have also been reports of the military junta’s widespread use of forced 
labor (most notoriously during the Yadana Natural Gas Pipeline Project), 
religious persecutions against persons of Islamic faith, and forcible 
relocation of civilians to accommodate various construction projects.90  
 
 
 83. See PREEG, supra note 28, at 114; see also Silverstein, Evolution, supra note 72, at 25–26.  
 84. Taylor, Pathways, supra note 57, at 22. 
 85. Taylor, Political Values, supra note 72, at 39. 
 86. Callahan, Making Enemies, supra note 61, at 11. 
 87. While living in Myanmar, the author observed how wealth has become concentrated tightly 
in the hands of the ruling military regime, whose members monopolize the benefits accrued from 
foreign trade and investment. In addition, the public education system is neglected and frequent 
closures of universities deprive the younger generation of much needed higher education; in contrast, 
the military colleges remain open throughout this time. Lastly, government spending is exclusively 
concentrated on strengthening military infrastructure rather than on other public programs.  
 88. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been placed under house arrest on three separate occasions: from 
September 1989 to July 1995, from September 2000 to May 2002, and most recently since September 
2003. See Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Pages, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi: Biography, http://www.dassk. 
com/categories.php?category_no=5 (click on hyperlinks for Parts 1–3, 6, 9).  
 89. For the latest reports on detainees in Myanmar, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRACKDOWN: 
REPRESSION OF THE 2007 POPULAR PROTESTS IN BURMA (2007), available at http://hrw.org/reports/ 
2007/burma1207/burma1207web.pdf (last visited June 21, 2008).  
 90. Cleveland, supra note 49, at 8–9.  
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B. Responses to Human Rights Conditions in Myanmar 
The crackdown on the 1988 pro-democracy uprisings, the refusal to 
hand over power after the 1990 national elections, the continuing political 
impasse, and reports of the government’s participation in widespread 
human rights abuses have all garnered international condemnation of the 
military regime in Myanmar. Mistakenly hailed as the “South Africa of the 
1990s,” the transnational campaign to improve human rights conditions in 
Myanmar has come from international institutions, regional trade 
associations, non-governmental organizations, and individual nations.91 
These transnational responses range from denunciations by various United 
Nations bodies to complete trade withdrawals and consumer boycotts 
under the U.S. unilateral sanctions policies.92  
1. International Institutional Responses 
International institutional responses against the military junta in 
Myanmar have come in the form of denunciations by United Nations 
bodies, frequent publicity for the opposition’s efforts and achievements, 
suspension of economic aid and financial support, and, in some cases, 
outright expulsion from international organizations.93 The U.N. General 
Assembly and the Human Rights Commission have repeatedly adopted 
annual resolutions condemning Myanmar’s human rights practices, with 
the Human Rights Commission having a special rapporteur appointed to 
Myanmar since 1992.94 In 1991, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize, which galvanized public support for her struggle for 
democracy and brought substantial international attention to the Myanmar 
crisis.95 The World Bank has suspended economic aid to Myanmar since 
 
 
 91. For a brief explanation of why hailing Myanmar as the “South Africa of the 1990s” is 
misleading, see infra note 151 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion on the South Africa 
comparison, see INT’L CRISIS GROUP (ICG), MYANMAR: SANCTIONS, ENGAGEMENT OR ANOTHER 
WAY FORWARD?, ICG ASIA REPORT NO. 78, 20–21 (2004), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
home/index.cfm?id=2677 (last visited May 3, 2008) [hereinafter ICG, SANCTIONS].  
 92. See infra notes 94–112 and accompanying text. 
 93. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 56/231, U.N. GAOR, 56th 
Sess., 92d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/231 (Feb. 28, 2002); see also Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar, Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2003/12, U.N. ESCOR, 51st mtg., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2003/12 (Apr. 16, 2003). The U.N. documents relating to Myanmar’s human rights 
conditions are available online at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/a/mmya.htm. 
 95. A list of Nobel Peace Prize laureates and a brief biography of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is 
available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/ (for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
biography, follow “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi” hyperlink; then follow “Biography” hyperlink) (last 
visited June 2, 2008). 
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the crackdown on the democratic uprisings and has used incremental 
restoration of aid as leverage to improve political and human rights 
conditions in Myanmar.96 Additionally, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), after investigating the country’s forced labor practices 
and after the regime’s failure to comply with the ILO’s recommendations, 
effectively expelled Myanmar from the organization.97 
2. Regional Responses 
Collective responses from regional trade associations vary greatly 
between Western democracies and Myanmar’s Asian neighbors. 
Following the U.S. lead, the European Union has taken extensive 
diplomatic and economic action against Myanmar, though not nearly as 
comprehensive as the U.S. unilateral practice.98 The EU has imposed an 
arms embargo, suspended bilateral aid other than humanitarian aid, 
publicized the opposition’s efforts, voiced its own human rights concerns, 
declined entry visas to Burmese government officials, and suspended 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits for Burmese industrial 
and agricultural exports to the European Union.99 
In stark contrast, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
has pursued a policy of constructive engagement with the military regime 
“in support of a gradual process of democratization, but with greater 
emphasis on economic reforms that over time will presumably foster 
 
 
 96. See PREEG, supra note 28, at 117 (“[T]he cutoff of almost all economic aid and financial 
support form the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and bilateral aid donors . . . deprives 
[Myanmar] of up to a billion dollars per year in project assistance.”); see also Cleveland, supra note 
49, at 13. Additional information relating to the World Bank’s assessment of Myanmar and its 
involvement in the country is available online at http://www.worldbank.org/mm.  
 97. See, e.g., Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Resolution on the Widespread Use of Forced Labour in 
Myanmar, 87th Sess. (June 1999), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ 
ilc87/com-myan.htm; see also Press Release, Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], ILO Governing Body Opens the 
Way for Unprecedented Action Against Forced Labour in Myanmar, ILO/00/44 (Nov. 17, 2000), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Press_releases/ 
lang--en/WCMS_007818/index.htm (last visited May 3, 2008). In November of 2000, the ILO urged 
its 175 member countries to impose sanctions against Myanmar for its poor track record on forced 
labor. In response, the military junta allowed the ILO to open an office in Yangon in 2002. A year 
later, the ILO withdrew its threat after agreeing on a plan of action with the government aimed towards 
complete elimination of forced labor in Myanmar. Id. Press Release, Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], ILO, 
Myanmar Agree on Facilitator to Help End Forced Labour, ILO/03/21 (May 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Press_releases/lang--en/W 
CMS_005271/index.htm (last visited May 3, 2008).  
 98. Cleveland, supra note 49, at 14–15 (detailing the European Union’s response to human rights 
conditions in Myanmar).  
 99. See The European Union, The EU’s Relations with Myanmar (Burma), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/myanmar/intro/index.htm (last visited May 3, 2008). 
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democratic political change as well.”100 While safeguarding its own 
economic interests in Myanmar from the growing Chinese influence, 
ASEAN argued that the U.S. unilateral sanctions against Myanmar could 
precipitate economic collapse and political violence in Myanmar, leaving 
ASEAN to pick up the pieces.101 In 1997, ASEAN admitted Myanmar as a 
member in the face of vehement criticism from the United States and 
European Union.102 
China has become Myanmar’s most important trading partner, foreign 
investor, and arms supplier since the early 1990s.103 The uncontrolled flow 
of Chinese nationals and goods into northern Myanmar is unmistakable in 
the recent transformation of Mandalay, the second largest city and capital 
of middle Myanmar. China’s desire to expand its economic and strategic 
influence into Myanmar is linked to its policy of promoting economic 
growth in its southwestern provinces, which have lagged behind the 
booming coastal provinces.104 In addition, China’s interaction with the 
military junta includes official state visits, military cooperation between 
the two nations, sale of armaments, and bilateral agreements to build 
roads, bridges, airports, and other infrastructure developments—all at 
“friendship prices.”105 
3. The U.S. Response 
The United States has played a leading role in focusing international 
attention on Myanmar and garnering transnational condemnation against 
the human rights conditions there. However, the United States’ blind 
 
 
 100. PREEG, supra note 28, at 117; see also Cleveland, supra note 49, at 15 (detailing the 
ASEAN’s response to human rights conditions in Myanmar).  
 101. PREEG, supra note 28, at 118. 
 102. For an overview of Myanmar’s foreign relations with ASEAN, see N. Ganesan, Myanmar’s 
Foreign Relations: Reaching Out to the World, in MYANMAR: BEYOND POLITICS TO SOCIETAL 
IMPERATIVES 30, 44–47 (Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, & Tin Maung Maung Than eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter Ganesan, Foreign Relations]. 
 103. Id. at 35–38. 
 104. Two objectives stand out when analyzing Myanmar’s strategic importance to China: first, 
penetration into Myanmar would allow China to link up its underdeveloped southwestern provinces 
with the fast growing economies of Southeast and South Asia; second, an overland route to a deep sea 
port in Myanmar would open an Indian Ocean trade route and allow China to export cheap consumer 
goods to surrounding countries. For a detailed account of Myanmar’s strategic role in regional 
security, see J. Mohan Malik, Myanmar’s Role in Regional Security—Pawn or Pivot?, in BURMA: 
PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 109 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 1998). 
 105. PREEG, supra note 28, at 118–19; see also Cleveland, supra note 49, at 17–18 (predicting 
“China’s energetic pursuit of trade and investment in Myanmar may be the single most significant 
impediment to the success of the transnational sanctions efforts”) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
WORLD REPORT 1995, 135; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1996, 133).  
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resolve to use only comprehensive sanctions against the military junta 
might delay the democratization process in the long run and cause 
needless suffering among the Burmese people in the meantime. Prior to 
1996, the United States suspended anti-narcotics assistance and economic 
aid to Myanmar, indefinitely discontinued Myanmar’s preferred trading 
status, imposed an arms embargo, limited diplomatic relations with 
Myanmar by declining to appoint an ambassador, and encouraged other 
nations to do the same.106 In addition, several state and local 
governments—most notably Massachusetts—adopted selective purchasing 
laws against Myanmar, which prohibit them from entering into 
procurement contracts with any company that is currently doing business 
with Myanmar.107 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Burma Statute, which imposed a 
variety of mandatory sanctions against Myanmar for human rights 
violations and authorized the president to bar new investment in Myanmar 
by U.S. nationals if the president found either specified acts against the 
person of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or “large-scale repression of or violence 
against the democratic opposition.”108 In May 1997, President Clinton 
declared a national emergency, as required by the IEEPA, and invoked 
sanctions.109 The most recent U.S. sanctions against Myanmar, however, 
are based on the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, enacted 
in response to the alleged SPDC-instigated attack on Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi and her supporters in May of 2003.110 The President may lift the 
 
 
 106. For a detailed description of the U.S. measures taken against Myanmar between 1988 and 
1996, see Cleveland, supra note 49, at 9–11 (citing several reports from the Human Rights Watch, 
available at http://hrw.org/doc/?t=asia_pub&c=burma (last visited Apr. 3, 2008)).  
 107. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 7, § 22 H(a), J(a) (West 2000) (“A state agency, a state 
authority, the house of representatives or the state senate may not procure goods or services from . . . 
any persons currently doing business with Myanmar.”). But see Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidating the Massachusetts Burma Statute by upholding the First 
Circuit’s determination that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional because it was preempted by 
the Federal Myanmar sanctions and thus was in violation of the Supremacy Clause. However, the 
Court did not reach a decision on whether the Massachusetts law infringed on the Federal 
Government’s authority to conduct foreign affairs, or whether it violated the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause, thus leaving unanswered the question of whether local and state sanctions laws 
could be held constitutional in the absence of federal legislation preempting.).  
 108. 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 
3009-166 (1996).  
 109. Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1998), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). It is not 
clear whether President Clinton derived his authority to impose sanctions from the Federal Burma 
Statute or the IEEPA because the former did not provide specific authority for the President to 
implement sanctions. For a detailed account of the events leading to the enactment of the Federal 
Burma Statute and eventual imposition of sanctions by President Clinton, see PREEG, supra note 28, at 
119–26.  
 110. Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, § 2(4), 117 Stat. 864, 
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sanctions only upon a finding that the SPDC has made measurable 
progress toward implementing a democratic government, including 
releasing all political prisoners, allowing freedom of speech and the press, 
allowing freedom of association, and permitting the peaceful exercise of 
religion.111 Lastly, President Bush further tightened U.S. unilateral 
sanctions in the immediate aftermath of the brutal crackdown of the 
protests in September of 2007.112 
III. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS AGAINST 
MYANMAR 
A blanket statement that unilateral sanctions are ineffective tools of 
foreign policy is overly simplistic and often misleading. Such a statement 
fails to appreciate specific characteristics of a particular sanctions episode, 
such as when and how the sanctions are imposed, to what ends, what the 
unexpected successes and the unintended consequences are, and what the 
reasonable expectations should be.113 Furthermore, unilateral sanctions are 
not ineffective per se; there is nothing intrinsically suggestive of their 
inefficacy. Unilateral sanctions are often effective vehicles for change; 
whether the change effected is that which is desired is a different matter, 
however. The evaluation of efficacy is necessary only when unilateral 
sanctions are used as the chosen means, out of many available, to achieve 
some specified policy end.114 
Closely related to the question of efficacy is the clear identification of 
the desired ends. Because efficacy is an assessment of the causal 
relationship between the means and the ends, a different set of ends gives 
rise to a different set of criteria by which the means are judged, which in 
turn affects the overall evaluation of efficacy. However, the malleable 
nature of the political goals as well as the ambiguity in identifying them 
 
 
864 (2003) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)).  
 111. Id. § 3(3)(B), 117 Stat. at 864. 
 112. See Exec. Order No. 13,448, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,223 (Oct. 23, 2007) (granting the Treasury 
Department discretion to block property and prohibit certain transactions of the supporters of the 
Myanmar military regime); see also Exe. Order No. 13,464, 73 Fed. Reg. 24,491 (May 2, 2008). 
 113. There is no magic formula to accurately predict the exact outcome of a particular sanctions 
episode. Even the general theories extrapolated from empirical data of previous sanctions episodes 
serve only as general guideposts. Because no two sanctions episodes are exactly alike, each episode 
must be analyzed on a case by case basis and in a country-specific manner. See HUFBAUER ET AL., 
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 92 (“Idiosyncratic influences are often at play. Human 
personalities and plain luck may well determine the outcome of a sanctions episode.”).  
 114. An alternative question to ask, for foreign policy purposes, is whether unilateral sanctions are 
the most effective means to promote certain foreign policy ends. 
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correctly add an additional layer of complexity to the debate.115 Thus, it is 
difficult to assess the efficacy of unilateral sanctions if the goals are not 
well defined, or if they change depending on the circumstances. For 
example, the foreign policy goals of any unilateral sanctions episode can 
be categorized either broadly or narrowly, and the resulting ends could 
range from promotion of transcendent goals, such as human rights and 
democracy, to promotion of specific goals, such as freedom of press.116 It 
is also important to differentiate between the stated and unstated goals and 
to determine which goals hold more sway.117 Accounting for the role that 
partial achievements of certain objectives play in the overall assessment of 
the effectiveness of the whole sanctions episode is also important, though 
difficult. 
In this Part, I assess the efficacy of the U.S. comprehensive sanctions 
against Myanmar along political and economic lines. I start with the 
political and economic framework developed in the Hufbauer empirical 
study.118 I then incorporate the social and religious aspects of the Burmese 
culture and apply the conclusions drawn in the Hufbauer study to the 
Burmese context.  
The U.S. unilateral sanctions against Myanmar will not succeed 
because they were ill-conceived, and their foreign policy goals are unclear 
and too lofty. Although promotion of human rights and democracy is 
needed in Myanmar, trying to accomplish this task through unilateral 
sanctions is overly ambitious, especially without a thorough consideration 
and understanding of the internal historical, political, and social landscape 
of Myanmar. 
Second, our Western allies are reluctant to follow the U.S. lead in 
implementing a policy for Myanmar, especially given the comprehensive 
nature of U.S. unilateral sanctions. Likewise, the unilateral sanctions have 
alienated U.S. allies in the region and strengthened China’s hand. Third, 
Myanmar’s Asian neighbors undermine the effectiveness of the U.S. 
 
 
 115. The political, economic, legal, social, and cultural variables used in the determination of the 
efficacy of sanctions could have different importance and weight depending on the nature of the ends 
identified and chosen. 
 116. A possible subdivision of goals in the above example is limited to a sanctions episode 
involving a major policy change. Professor Hufbauer and colleagues employ a broader classification of 
foreign policy goals: to dissuade military adventures, impair military potential, destabilize foreign 
governments, and pursue both modest as well as major policy changes in target countries. See supra 
notes 3, 40–43 and accompanying text.  
 117. For example, a sanctions episode with a stated goal of promoting human rights and 
democracy in a target country might put more emphasis on an unstated goal of pleasing human rights 
activists in the sender country.  
 118. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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unilateral sanctions through their continued—and in some cases 
increased—trade with the military regime. Fourth, the unilateral sanctions 
harm the United States’ commercial and geopolitical interests. Last and 
perhaps most important, the U.S. sanctions deprive Myanmar’s people of 
influential Western political ideas such as freedom, democracy, and 
human rights that normally accompany trade with the United States. 
A. Political and Social Variables Implicated in the Determination of the 
Efficacy of the Unilateral Sanctions 
Political and social variables, both domestic and international, 
influence the outcome of a given sanctions episode in a sanctions-specific 
manner. As such, a careful analysis of these factors is critical before taking 
the bold step of imposing sanctions.119 Political variables that are 
traditionally implicated when assessing the effectiveness of unilateral 
sanctions include the foreign policy objective(s) sought by the sanctions, 
political support for the policy, duration of the sanctions, extent of 
international cooperation in imposing sanctions, presence of international 
assistance to the target country, political stability and economic health of a 
target country, and prior relations between sender and target.120 
1. The U.S. Comprehensive Sanctions Against Myanmar Will Not 
Succeed Because Policy Objectives Are Unclear and Promotion of 
Human Rights and Democracy in Myanmar Will Ultimately Require 
the Military Junta to Relinquish Power 
Success or failure of a particular sanctions episode depends on the 
nature of the foreign policy goal sought—the loftier the foreign policy 
goal, the less likely the sanctions will succeed.121 The Hufbauer study also 
stresses that sanctions are not particularly effective in bringing about 
major policy changes in the target country, and that sender countries need 
a near monopoly over trading relations with the target country to have a 
 
 
 119. Not only is it important to carefully analyze the political, economic, and social variables that 
are traditionally implicated in the efficacy assessment at the outset of each sanctions episode, but it is 
also critical to reanalyze these factors while the sanctions are in place, when the sanctions are clearly 
ineffective, or when the sanctions are up for renewal.  
 120. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 40. 
 121. Id. at 93 (“[T]he success rate importantly depends on the type of policy or governmental 
change sought. Episodes involving destabilization succeeded in half the cases, usually against target 
countries that were small and shaky. Cases involving modest goals and attempts to disrupt minor 
military adventures were successful about a third of the time. Efforts to impair a foreign adversary’s 
military potential, or otherwise to change its policies in a major way, succeeded only infrequently.”). 
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remote chance of the sanctions succeeding.122 Furthermore, sanctions that 
are imposed primarily in response to domestic political pressures and to 
demonstrate moral outrage—without any intention of promoting real 
change in the target country’s behavior—are sanctions in appearance only 
and have no real positive effect. 
The goals expressed in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003, which form the basis for the current U.S. comprehensive sanctions 
against Myanmar, are ubiquitous and, in some cases, conflicting. As a 
result, it is difficult to pinpoint the primary purpose behind the 
sanctions.123 The Preamble of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
of 2003 lists a number of overarching goals: “[t]o sanction the ruling 
Burmese military junta [the SPDC], to strengthen Myanmar’s democratic 
forces and support and recognize the National League [for] Democracy 
[NLD] as the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people.”124 The 
goals expressed in the Preamble are supplemented by additional conditions 
that must be met before the sanctions are disengaged: that the SPDC make 
“substantial and measurable progress to end violations of internationally 
recognized human rights . . . [and implement] a democratic government 
[by] releasing all political prisoners; allowing freedom of speech and the 
press; allowing freedom of association; permitting the peaceful exercise of 
religion; and [agreeing] . . . on the transfer of power to a civilian 
government . . . .”125 
It is unlikely that the U.S. comprehensive sanctions against Myanmar 
will succeed in achieving the goals articulated in the Burmese Freedom 
and Democracy Act of 2003. First, the “substantial and measurable 
progress” standard required for lifting the sanctions is vague, inflexible in 
its application, and unlikely to be attained given the political situation in 
Myanmar. Second, by publicly recognizing the NLD as the legitimate 
representative of the Myanmar people, the U.S. government has alienated 
the moderate faction within the military junta and further strengthened the 
position of the hardliners. Third, the often repeated rhetoric of promoting 
democracy and protecting human rights in Myanmar was intended only to 
 
 
 122. Id. at 94–95. 
 123. The goals sought by the U.S. comprehensive sanctions against Myanmar could be a 
combination of any of the following: to change the military regime’s policies on human rights and 
democracy, to inflict economic hardship on Myanmar, to punish the leaders of the military regime, to 
induce a regime change, to legitimize Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, to rally support for 
democratic forces in Myanmar, or to make human rights activists in the United States feel good. 
 124. Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, pmbl., 117 Stat. 864, 
964 (2003) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)). 
 125. Id. § 3(3)(A)-(B), 117 Stat. at 866. 
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appease domestic pressures to take action. Last, the loftiness of the goals 
expressed in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 boil down 
to a call for a regime change in Myanmar.126 In response, the SPDC placed 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi under house-arrest,127 forced the NLD to exclude 
itself from the ongoing national conventions,128 and ousted a moderate 
member of the junta (Prime Minister Khin Nyunt) in favor of an SPDC 
hardliner.129 
2. Two Decades of Economic Coercion in Myanmar Without 
Significant Improvements in Human Rights Conditions Suggests 
Diminishing Prospects for Success 
Success in a particular sanctions episode is inversely proportional to 
the duration of the sanctions—the longer the sanctions remain in place, the 
less likely they are going to be successful.130 The U.S. unilateral sanctions 
were imposed against Myanmar in three stages: the strategic “turning of 
the screws” (1) commenced with the suspension of economic aid 
immediately after the pro-democracy crackdown in 1988, (2) continued 
with the prohibition of new investment under the Federal Burma Statute in 
1997, and (3) culminated in the imposition of comprehensive sanctions 
under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.131 Two decades 
of economic pressure without meaningful improvements in Burmese 
human rights conditions suggest diminishing prospects for success since 
 
 
 126. It is highly unlikely that the military junta, which has never been accountable to the 
Myanmar people and has so far ruled Myanmar by force and through fear, would suddenly decide to 
step down in favor of a civilian government without any joint action from the international 
community.  
 127. For the most recent report on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s continued detention, see Burma 
Extends Suu Kyi’s Detention, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/ 
6691935.stm (last visited May 3, 2008) (reporting the extension of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s house 
arrest by one year). 
 128. For a criticism of the NLD’s boycott of the national convention, see Yin Yin Myint, 
Editorial, Wrong Vision for Myanmar, WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at A14. 
 129. For more information on the internal coup that removed Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, see 
Ellen Nakashima, Burmese Military Rulers Force Out Prime Minister, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2004, at 
A16. In an apparent bid by General Than Shwe to consolidate power, General Khin Nyunt was 
removed from power and replaced with Lt. General Soe Win, who is rumored to have instigated the 
attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in May of 2003. Id. See also Promulgation of Law Repealing 
National Intelligence Bureau Law and Dissolution of the National Intelligence Bureau, THE NEW 
LIGHT OF MYANMAR, Oct. 23, 2004 [hereinafter NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR, Dissolution], available at 
http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/NLM-2004/Oct04/enlm/Oct23_h1.html (reporting the abolishment of 
the National Intelligence Bureau, the source of General Khin Nyunt’s power). 
 130. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 100–01. 
 131. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
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“[a] heavy, slow hand invites both evasion and the mobilization of [anti-
American] domestic opinion.”132 
The lengthy duration and incremental nature of the U.S. sanctions 
present the Myanmar government with a number of public relations 
opportunities. First, the Myanmar government has been able to shift the 
blame for its economic failures to the continuance of the U.S. sanctions. 
This deflection of criticism to the United States, coupled with a very 
public withdrawal of U.S. economic interests from Myanmar, is used by 
the Myanmar government to inspire anti-American nationalism.133 Second, 
the prolonged duration of the sanctions has allowed the Myanmar 
government to carefully craft and implement mechanisms for evasion, 
aided especially by third-party commercial interests, which benefit from 
the exclusion of American companies.134 Lastly, even though popular 
opinion in the United States welcomed the Burmese sanctions at the 
outset, public support for the sanctions has and will continue to dissipate 
in both countries the longer sanctions remain in place.  
3. Although the United States Is Able to Rally Its Western Allies to 
Join Its Unilateral Sanctions Efforts, It Is Unable to Persuade 
Myanmar’s Asian Trading Partners to Impose Economic Sanctions 
Against Myanmar 
Although much emphasis has been placed on achieving international 
cooperation, “[m]ore [i]s [n]ot [n]ecessarily [m]errier.”135 Despite its many 
symbolic benefits,136 international cooperation is often difficult to achieve 
and usually requires a compromise on sanction-related demands. Recent 
economic interdependence between nations, induced by globalization and 
technological advancement, has made coalition-forming for the sake of 
constructing trade barriers less desirable. In assessing the U.S. unilateral 
 
 
 132. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 100. 
 133. Prior to the imposition of import controls under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003, the U.S. textile companies formerly exempt under the Federal Burma Statute had already left 
Myanmar for Cambodia and other Southeast Asian countries because of power shortages. 
Nevertheless, the Myanmar government blamed the closing of these textile factories on the sanctions, 
diverting potential criticism against the government’s inability to provide electricity in most parts of 
the country. Confidential Interviews with Various Textile Manufacturers, in Myan. (on file with 
author). 
 134. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
 135. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 95. 
 136. Id. at 96 (“[I]nternational cooperation may serve three useful functions: to increase the moral 
suasion of the sanction, to help isolate the target country from the global community psychologically 
as well as economically, and to preempt foreign backlash, thus minimizing corrosive friction within 
the alliance.”). 
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sanctions against Myanmar, the critical question is not the number of 
senders, but the identities of the senders and the non-senders and their 
respective present and future economic relationships with Myanmar. 
The United States’ inability to persuade many of Myanmar’s key 
trading partners to help isolate Myanmar economically and 
psychologically from the global community limits the likelihood of 
success. To this day, the United States remains the only nation to impose 
comprehensive sanctions against Myanmar.137 Although the European 
Union has partially joined the U.S. efforts,138 Myanmar’s Asian neighbors 
have continued their previous trading relationships with the military 
junta.139 Unless China, Singapore, and Thailand—Myanmar’s three largest 
trading partners—join the sanctions efforts, the U.S. comprehensive 
sanctions will serve only a symbolic role. Even more, by attempting to 
promote human rights and democracy in Myanmar through the imposition 
of unilateral sanctions, the United States has alienated its allies in the 
ASEAN and may have ultimately damaged its geopolitical interests in 
Asia.140  
4. The Impact of the U.S. Comprehensive Sanctions Is Offset by 
Myanmar’s Increased Trade with China, India, Thailand, and Its 
Other ASEAN Neighbors 
In contrast to the difficulties associated with obtaining international 
cooperation, international assistance the target country receives from its 
allies and neighbors often reduces the burden imposed by the sanctions.141 
However, unlike the Cold War cases, in which assistance was provided to 
make a symbolic stand against the policy excesses of a rival power, 
today’s version of assistance is fueled by geopolitical concerns, the 
economic need to fill the void left by the sanctions, and competition to 
gain market shares in the target country. International assistance to the 
military junta in Myanmar comes from its Asian neighbors as they 
compete to fill the void left by withdrawal of U.S. and European firms and 
is sustained by the geopolitical checks and balances between China, India, 
and the ASEAN member nations.  
 
 
 137. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
 140. See Leon T. Hadar, U.S. Sanctions Against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts, 1 TRADE POLICY 
ANALYSIS 1, 6–8 (1998), available at http://www.freetrade.org/node/62 (last visited May 3, 2008); see 
also PREEG, supra note 28, at 136. 
 141. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 45. 
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The impact of the U.S. comprehensive sanctions against Myanmar is 
reduced because Myanmar is able to rely on China, India, and its ASEAN 
neighbors to keep open alternative markets and financing sources. First, 
Myanmar’s economic and political relationship with China has grown 
exponentially since the early 1990s; cross-border migration and increasing 
control of the economy by well financed Chinese traders is evident in and 
around Mandalay.142  
Second, in order to counterbalance the growing Chinese influence in 
the region, ASEAN has pursued a policy of constructive engagement with 
the Burmese regime against U.S. wishes.143 As a result, China, Singapore, 
Thailand, and the rest of Myanmar’s Asian neighbors account for more 
than ninety percent of Myanmar’s imports.144 Likewise, Thailand, India, 
and China have represented main destinations for Burmese goods since the 
imposition of U.S. import controls.145 
Third, market shares controlled by Myanmar’s trading partners may be 
even greater than reported because a large percentage of Myanmar’s cross-
border trade with India, China, and Thailand is conducted outside the 
purview of official records. Unrecorded black-market trade in timber, 
gems, and goods between Myanmar and its neighbors is estimated to be in 
the billions.146  
Last, Myanmar may have developed new strategies to counteract the 
threat of more severe sanctions from the United States. Myanmar’s exports 
to Thailand doubled between 2003 and 2004, despite a reduction in natural 
gas exports from Myanmar, possibly making up for the loss of textile 
exports to the U.S. market.147 The reality of the situation is this: although 
the U.S. sanctions exact some costs on Myanmar’s military regime,148 the 
 
 
 142. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.  
 143. PREEG, supra note 28, at 117–18; see supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also Malik, 
supra note 104, at 110–23. 
 144. Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report Myanmar: February 2005 (Feb. 2005) at 49, 
available at http://www.eiu.com (available for a fee, also on file with author) (listing China (28.9%), 
Singapore (20.7%), Thailand (14%), Malaysia (9.2%), and South Korea (5.5%) as Myanmar’s five 
largest official importers for 2003). 
 145. Id. After excluding the United States (9.7%), Thailand (30.2%), India (9%), China (5.6%), 
and Japan (4.5%) represent the main destinations for exports in 2003. Id. 
 146. See Hadar, supra note 140, at 6; see also Nelson Rand, Myanmar: The Case Against 
Sanctions, ASIA TIMES, June 20, 2003, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ 
EF20Ae02.html (last visited May 3, 2008). 
 147. See Economic Intelligence Unit, supra note 144, at 49 (stating that according to data from the 
Bank of Thailand, Myanmar’s exports to Thailand rose by 42.4% in the first 11 months of 2004—from 
$827 million in 2003 to $1,177.5 million in 2004); see also Rand, supra note 146. 
 148. See Rand, supra note 146. The U.S. unilateral sanctions against the military junta in 
Myanmar deprive the ruling generals of any semblance of legitimacy. Furthermore, the cost of doing 
business is higher since the Burmese government must find alternative markets. 
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Burmese generals have never been cut off from alternative markets and 
financing sources. 
5. It Is Extremely Difficult for the Predominantly Buddhist and 
Agrarian Population of Myanmar to Rise up and Demand Change 
Because the U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Have Further Deepened the 
Existing Political and Economic Inequalities Between the Military 
and Civilian Population 
The outcome of a sanctions episode is strongly correlated to the 
political and economic health of the target country, as countries that are 
under severe political and economic strain are more likely to yield to 
external pressures for change.149 A successful outcome is, however, not 
guaranteed even in the face of political and economic distress; additional 
factors, such as the target government’s hold on power, its willingness to 
enter into pragmatic negotiations, and its accountability to the constituents 
often come into play. In Myanmar, unintended consequences of the U.S. 
sanctions arguably may have undermined their impact. In addition to 
imposing political and economic strain on the military elite as well as the 
civilian population, the U.S. unilateral sanctions have further entrenched 
the military government, deprived the civilian population of the ability to 
hold the government accountable, and weakened the democratic 
opposition.150 
Proponents of the sanctions often cite sanctions against the apartheid 
government in South Africa as evidence that economic pressure can be an 
effective weapon for political change. However, the analogy that 
Myanmar is the “South Africa of the 1990s” is misleading.151 Unlike 
South Africa, Myanmar’s economy and public infrastructure were already 
in ruins before the sanctions because of mismanagement, corruption, and 
self-imposed isolation from the global community. In addition, 
Myanmar’s economy had very little connection to the global economy 
 
 
 149. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 46 (“An analogy with 
rainmaking is appropriate. If storm clouds are overhead, rain may fall without anyone’s help. If 
moisture-laden clouds are in the sky, chemical seeding may bring forth rain. But if the skies are clear 
and dry, no amount of human assistance will produce rain. Similarly, sanctions may be redundant, 
productive, or useless in pursing foreign policy goals, depending on the economic health and political 
stability of the target country.”).  
 150. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 151. There is no denying the similarity between Nelson Mandela and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 
both charismatic and selfless leaders of their respective causes who unfortunately face similar trials 
and tribulations in their struggles. For a detailed South Africa comparison, see also ICG, SANCTIONS, 
supra note 91, at 20–21. 
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before sanctions, owing to more than a quarter century of isolation. 
Finally, internal and external pressure against apartheid in South Africa 
centered on a universally identifiable norm transgression—racial 
discrimination—whereas the human rights violations alleged against the 
Burmese generals are only tenuously linked to norm transgressions and are 
less recognizable according to international law. 
Instead of promoting positive political change, the U.S. unilateral 
sanctions have made the military government stronger relative to the 
civilian population, further entrenching its role as a state-building 
institution. Rather than impacting the sectors of the Burmese economy 
under total state control, the U.S. unilateral sanctions exact their toll on 
parts that are controlled by the private sector.152 As a result, the military 
government is able to gain greater control of Myanmar’s economy. This 
enables the military government to shift the resources of the country to 
sectors that support the regime. Consequently, governmental institutions 
needed for the establishment of democracy are neglected while benefits 
from foreign trade are invested in the military infrastructure and for the 
benefit of a selected few.153 
Despite widespread international condemnation and internal dissent, 
the Tatmadaw remains a powerful and well organized institution inside 
Myanmar and continues unchanged with its primary objective of 
maintaining national sovereignty and unity. The SPDC, even after one 
name change, has been in power for the nearly twenty years since its 
bloody crackdown on the democracy uprisings. The military controls 
every aspect of Burmese political life and maintains its rule through 
violence and fear.154 Removal of General Khin Nyunt and his moderate 
faction from power further signifies consolidation of power in the hands of 
 
 
 152. It is this author’s opinion that Myanmar’s current political and economic predicament would 
be different if the United States had pursued trade expansion instead of sanctions in the mid-1990s. 
The military government at that time did not have the logistical capability to manage and control 
increased trade flows into Myanmar, which in turn would allow the private sector to fill the void. 
Instead, the U.S. sanctions and disinvestment campaigns decreased the trade flow, especially from the 
West, which allowed the military government to catch up and consolidate its grip on trade.  
 153. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 154. As a result of the military’s constant crackdown on the democratic forces, the majority of the 
Burmese people live under a shroud of fear, even if they are discontent with the junta’s policies. 
Likewise, a strong totalitarian rule during the past five decades has destroyed any hope for a civil 
society to take root in Myanmar. In addition, years of economic downturn have deprived Myanmar of 
a politically affluent middle-class. Furthermore, Myanmar remains an agrarian society with greater 
than seventy percent of the population living in the rural areas. Until Burmese from the rural areas 
express their political will and join the urban democratic forces, the military’s grip on power will 
likely continue. For a brief description of Myanmar’s social complexity and ethnic diversity, see 
Taylor, Pathways, supra note 57, at 2–3. 
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the hardliners as they continue to defy international calls for rapid political 
change.155 
More alarmingly, the Tatmadaw’s embedded role in Myanmar politics, 
and its stranglehold on power, has created a dual structure of governance 
and deprived the civilian population of previously existing forms of 
accountability. The question has never been whether the people of 
Myanmar can rise up to demand change. The moral courage of the 
Buddhist monks and students during the most recent demonstrations 
suggested as much. The critical question has always been: what happens 
after the people rise up? Sadly, in a country where the leaders are not 
accountable to their constituents, the answer so far has been: nothing 
much. Moreover, nearly a half century of economic stagnation and 
isolation has conditioned the Myanmar people to plod through their lives 
and adapt as best they can to any new economic challenges. 
The U.S. unilateral sanctions have also weakened the democratic 
opposition within the country. The military junta continues to impose tight 
restrictions on the NLD, and has recently extended the detention period to 
keep Daw Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest.156 Barring a split within 
the ruling hardliners, the SPDC will most likely proceed with its own 
version of political reforms under its “road map to democracy,” 
irrespective of its legitimacy.157 Towards this end, the SPDC recently 
reconvened and completed a critical round of the National Convention, 
which has the task of drafting the guidelines for a new constitution, despite 
 
 
 155. See Nakashima, supra note 129, at A16; see also NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR, Dissolution, 
supra note 129.  
 156. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 157. David Arnott, Burma/Myanmar: How to Read the Generals’ “Roadmap”—A Brief Guide 
with Links to the Literature (Aug. 27, 2003), http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/how9.html. The Seven-
Step Road Map to Principled Democracy laid out by then-Prime Minister Khin Nyunt during his State 
of the Union address includes:  
1) reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996;  
2) after the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step implementation of the 
process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system;  
3) drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and detailed basic 
principles laid down by the National Convention;  
4) adoption of the constitution through national referendum;  
5) holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (legislative bodies) according to the 
new constitution;  
6) convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new 
constitution; and  
7) building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by 
Hluttaw, and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw. 
Id.   
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boycotts from the NLD and other ethnic groups and in the face of 
questions concerning the National Convention’s legitimacy.158  
6. The Sanctions Have Further Deteriorated the Already Minimal 
Political and Economic Relationship Between the United States and 
Myanmar 
The intensity of prior relations between the sender and the target is 
often reflected in their trade linkage. As such, unilateral sanctions imposed 
against allies and close trading partners are more likely to succeed, while 
sanctions against adversaries and targets with very little trade linkage are 
less successful.159 However, the efficacy of unilateral sanctions against 
neutral targets may depend primarily on the trade linkage between the 
countries involved. During the Cold War, Myanmar was one of the 
nonaligned countries that benefited from the rivalry between the United 
States and Soviet Union, even though it had very little economic contact 
with the outside world.160 Nevertheless, the U.S. unilateral sanctions 
against Myanmar will most likely be ineffective because successive 
rounds of sanctions and consumer boycotts in recent years have further 
decimated the already minimal trading relationship between the two 
countries.161 
B. Economic Variables Involved in the Assessment of the Effectiveness of 
the Burmese Sanctions 
Similar to the political and social variables analyzed above, economic 
factors also influence the outcome of a sanctions episode. Although the 
underlying factors that influence the outcome of a sanctions episode are 
 
 
 158. Seven-Step Road Map Agenda Was Laid Down Only by Government—National Convention, 
First Step of Road Map, Is Most Important, Will Continue Without Fail—Change of Prime Minister 
Does Not Change Government’s Road Map Agenda, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR, Oct. 23, 2004, 
available at http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/NLM-2004/Oct04/enlm/Oct23_h2.html (reporting that the 
ouster of General Khin Nyunt, who had spearheaded the National Convention, will not derail the 
process). 
 159. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 100 (“The higher 
compliance with sanctions by allies and trading partners reflects their willingness to bend on specific 
issues in deference to an overall relationship with the sender country. Such considerations may not be 
decisive in the calculus of an antagonistic target country, or a target country that has little economic 
contact with the sender.”). 
 160. PREEG, supra note 28, at 116 (reporting that the BSSP, under U Ne Win, was sustained to a 
large extent by foreign economic aid from the U.S., Soviet Union, Japan, and multilateral development 
banks). 
 161. See infra notes 167–71 and accompanying text. 
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artificially grouped into political, social, and economic clusters, they do 
not exist in a vacuum and the interplay between them is critical. Economic 
variables that are traditionally analyzed in determining the efficacy of 
unilateral sanctions include the relative economic size difference and trade 
linkage between the sender and the target, the costs imposed on the target 
country, and the costs imposed on the sender country.162 
1. Limited Trade Linkage Between the United States and Myanmar 
Suggests That the U.S. Comprehensive Sanctions Against Myanmar 
Will Not Be Successful 
Since economic sanctions are historically employed by powerful 
countries against weaker nations, the economy of the sender is usually 
much larger than that of the target.163 However, it is not reasonable to 
predict the efficacy of a sanctions episode based solely on the relative 
economic size difference between the sender and the target. Additional 
factors come into play, such as the availability of alternative markets or 
financing sources and any trade linkage between the sender and the target. 
Although economic interdependence between various states has made 
them more sensitive to coercion from foreigners, the availability of 
alternative suppliers and markets allows countries to diversify their 
economic contacts, making them less susceptible to unilateral sanctions.164 
Although U.S. GNP is more than one hundred times greater than that of 
Myanmar,165 the lack of significant trade linkage between the countries, 
and the availability of alternative suppliers and markets for Myanmar’s 
trade needs, undermine the effectiveness of sanctions.166 
Likewise, the United States has very little leverage over Myanmar 
because its economic stake in the country is limited. Owing to successive 
rounds of economic sanctions, the United States was not able to establish a 
significant trading relationship with Myanmar when Myanmar opened its 
doors to the global community. Instead, the already minimal trade linkage 
between Myanmar and the United States has decreased significantly 
 
 
 162. HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 40. 
 163. Id. at 63 (“In most cases, the sender’s GNP is over 10 times greater than the target’s GNP, 
and in over half the ratio is greater than 50.”). 
 164. Chan & Drury, supra note 18, at 4 (“Economic interdependence implies less trade asymmetry 
and more partner diversification so that it becomes more difficult for unilateral coercion to succeed.”). 
 165. The Hufbauer study uses a GNP ratio to approximate the relative economic size between the 
sender and the target. Id. at 63–64. As of 2002, U.S. GNP ($10,402 billion) is over 100 times greater 
than Myanmar’s GNP ($92.9 billion). Id. 
 166. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text for the availability of alternative markets and 
financing sources for the Burmese generals. 
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during the past decade and a half. From 1989 to 1996, the United States 
was a leading investor in Myanmar’s oil and natural gas development, 
mining, and apparel manufacturing.167 However, the banning of new 
investment under the Federal Burma Statute168 and ensuing consumer 
boycotts caused many U.S. firms to shut down their operations in 
Myanmar.169 The void left by the departure of the U.S. firms was readily 
filled by Asian and European companies. However, Myanmar’s textile and 
apparel exports to the United States continued to grow, from $60 million 
in 1994 to $408 million in 2001 before falling to $297 million in 2002.170 
Still, Myanmar’s exports to the United States only made up about 9.4% of 
the country’s total exports in 2003.171  
2. The U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Inflict Economic Hardship on the 
Myanmar People and Deprive Them of Western Political Ideas 
About Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights That Normally 
Accompany Trade 
Economic sanctions are intended to inflict sufficient economic hardship 
in the target country that the targeted regime is compelled to change its 
behavior and policies. The situation in Myanmar, however, may represent 
an exception to the causal relationship between economic loss and 
political change. Rather than impacting the ruling elite, the burden of the 
U.S. unilateral sanctions falls mainly on the Myanmar people who do not 
have any means to hold the ruling junta accountable. At the same time, 
revolutionary fervor to rise up and demand change is tempered by 
reminders of the brutal crackdown in 1988, and most recently in 2007. The 
complexities of the political and social climate in Myanmar will require 
 
 
 167. See Hadar, supra note 140, at 6 (indicating that the United States was only the fifth largest 
foreign investor in Myanmar by 1995); see also PREEG, supra note 28, at 130 (“Total foreign direct 
investment into Myanmar from 1990 to 1995 was $1.2 billion . . . . [T]he United States was the largest 
source of this investment, with $281 million, or 23 percent of the total, but this amount was 
concentrated in 1990–1992 and has since dropped off.”). 
 168. See 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 
3009-166 (1996). 
 169. PREEG, supra note 28, at 129 (“Under pressure from the various U.S. sanction activities, 
name-brand U.S. companies—such as Liz Claiborne, Eddie Bauer, and Levi Strauss—terminated 
contracts with Myanmar producers, and some of the approximately 30 apparel operations reduced 
production or shut down.”). 
 170. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003, S. REP. NO. 108-281, at 1 
(2003) (reporting that total imports from Myanmar in 2002 were $356 million); see also Rand, supra 
note 146 (reporting that Myanmar's natural gas exports to Thailand in 2002 alone were more than 
double that figure, bringing in $846 million to the cash-starved junta). 
 171. See Economic Intelligence Unit, supra note 144, at 49. 
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more creative solutions than doggedly maintaining the belief that 
economic hardship on the Myanmar people will eventually bring about 
political change in Myanmar. 
Myanmar’s economy and public infrastructure were already in ruins 
prior to the imposition of sanctions, due to government mismanagement, 
corruption, and self-imposed isolation from the global community. As a 
result, other than worsening an already bad situation, the U.S. unilateral 
sanctions have not effected a drastic downturn in Myanmar’s economy. 
Moreover, new economic challenges associated with the sanctions are 
absorbed by the Myanmar people, as half a century of economic 
deterioration has conditioned them to accept and adapt to new forms of 
economic hardships.172 Further, the military junta controls every aspect of 
Burmese political life, rules the country through fear, and is not 
accountable to the civilian population. The docile nature of the Burmese 
people—shaped in part by religion, culture, and fear—further decreases 
their capacity to rise up against the military dictatorship.173 
In addition, the foreign aid cutoff and the U.S. unilateral sanctions 
further deepen the preexisting inequalities between those affiliated with 
the military and those who are not. The military junta continues to spend a 
significant amount of money on military infrastructure while many of the 
public programs, such as health care and education, are woefully 
neglected.174  
The overall adverse effects of the U.S. unilateral sanctions on the 
already deteriorating Burmese economy are negligible because of limited 
leverage, timing, and sequential imposition of the sanctions. The ban on 
new investment under the Federal Burma Statute, consumer boycotts of 
U.S. firms doing business in Myanmar, and internet advocacy contributed 
to the withdrawal of U.S. firms from Myanmar and their subsequent 
replacement by Asian and European companies.175 
Likewise, the most recent import controls instituted under the Burmese 
Freedom and Democracy Act, banning $356 million of mostly textile 
 
 
 172. See supra notes 149–58 and accompanying text.  
 173. This is not to discredit the brave men and women who risk their lives each day in Myanmar 
to bring about a better future. Nor is it a criticism of those who must maintain their silence as a 
consequence of potential violence.  
 174. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also INT’L CRISIS GROUP (ICG), MYANMAR: 
THE HIV/AIDS CRISIS, ICG ASIA BRIEFING PAPER, (2002) at 3, available at http://www.crisisgroup. 
org/home/index.cfm?id=1799&1=1 (last visited May 4, 2008) [hereinafter ICG, HIV/AIDS CRISIS] 
(discussing the difference between the Joint Programme’s estimates and the government’s estimates). 
 175. See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text; see also PREEG, supra note 28, at 128–29 
(detailing additional examples of European and Asian firms replacing U.S. commercial interests in 
Myanmar). 
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imports from Myanmar, constituted only a fraction of Myanmar’s total 
imports.176 A tragic consequence of the most recent import controls is that 
the burden will fall on the estimated 350,000 textile workers in Myanmar 
and not on the generals.177  
Finally, the U.S. unilateral sanctions deprive the Burmese civilian 
population of Western political ideas about freedom, human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law that normally accompany trade with the 
United States and other Western countries. It is critical that these political 
ideas are internalized by the Burmese people so that they may one day, 
with the help of the international community, promote positive change and 
transition to principled democracy and human rights in Myanmar. 
However, instead of relying on U.S. businesses to promote these ideas in 
Myanmar, or regulating the business conduct of U.S. firms in Myanmar, 
the U.S. unilateral sanctions bluntly halt any meaningful participation by 
the United States in this process.  
3. Although the Immediate Costs of the Sanctions Are Miniscule, the 
Long-Term Costs on U.S. Commercial Interests Are Staggering 
The U.S. unilateral sanctions policy against Myanmar is detrimental to 
U.S. political and strategic interests in the region. Significantly, the 
sanctions alienate ASEAN countries and other allies. A familiar pattern 
emerges from a survey of recent U.S. unilateral sanctions practices: the 
United States adopts unilateral sanctions to force rogue regimes to change 
their behavior; when that does not work, the United States tries to 
convince its trading partners and diplomatic allies to join in the sanctions 
crusade; finally, when its allies refuse to join in, the United States adopts 
secondary boycott measures against its reluctant allies.178 Myanmar’s 
recent admission into the ASEAN and the organization’s constant refusal 
to interfere with Myanmar’s domestic politics could potentially result in a 
long-term confrontation between the United States and its ASEAN 
allies.179 In addition to weakening its strategic interests in the region, the 
 
 
 176. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Rand, supra note 146, at 1 (referring to the retired World Bank economist Bradley 
Babson’s interview for the Far Eastern Economic Review on the prospects of the latest round of 
sanctions); see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Man in Havana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2003, at A15 
(reporting that many of the four hundred thousand textile workers in Myanmar, mainly women, stand 
to loose their jobs as a direct consequence of the sanctions). 
 178. See Hadar, supra note 140, at 7; see also Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (also referred to as the Helms-Burton 
Act). 
 179. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
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U.S. policy of isolating Myanmar could have the unwanted effect of 
strengthening China’s political and economic influence in Myanmar and 
the surrounding areas—a more troubling national security concern.  
Furthermore, the U.S. unilateral sanctions policy against Myanmar 
inflicts both short- and long-term commercial costs on American firms. 
Short-term effects on the U.S. firms are minimal: recent import controls 
under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act merely inconvenience 
the U.S. importers of Burmese textile goods. Because Myanmar is not 
alone in producing these goods, the U.S. companies can turn to producers 
from similar countries, such as Thailand and Bangladesh. The long-term 
effects on the U.S. firms, however, are potentially significant. The U.S. 
unilateral sanctions provide a competitive advantage to Japanese, ASEAN, 
and Chinese companies because the sanctions deny American companies 
the chance to compete for trade and investment opportunities in Myanmar. 
Additionally, lost opportunities for American companies in oil and natural 
gas exploration and other infrastructure building projects could have 
strategic consequences. Even if the sanctions are lifted in the future, the 
delayed market entry of U.S. firms could have a permanent deleterious 
effect on U.S. commercial interests. 
IV. LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF THE 
U.S. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS AGAINST MYANMAR 
The efficacy of unilateral economic sanctions is traditionally assessed 
along political and economic grounds. However, confining the analysis 
solely to political and economic variables is woefully inadequate. In 
deciding whether to impose unilateral sanctions, policymakers should also 
consider the validity of the sanctions under the international legal system; 
the social, cultural, and humanitarian context of a particular sanctions 
episode; and the availability of alternative mechanisms to promote the 
ends sought by the sanctions.180  
First, it is important to determine whether the U.S. comprehensive 
sanctions against Myanmar conflict with international law principles 
regarding state sovereignty, free trade, and human rights. Second, social 
and cultural influences on the capacity of the Myanmar people to promote 
change and the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis must be considered. 
Last, alternative mechanisms to promote human rights and democracy, 
 
 
 180. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
498 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:455 
 
 
 
 
such as humanitarian engagement and targeted sanctions, must be 
explored before resorting to unilateral sanctions. 
A. Legitimacy of the U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Under International Law 
The legitimacy of promoting human rights and democracy in Myanmar 
through the use of unilateral sanctions depends on the validity of these 
sanctions under international law. As such, unilateral sanctions should be 
employed with great care, after close scrutiny, and only as a last resort. 
Unilateral sanctions have frequently been criticized for coming into 
conflict with several international law principles. Critics of unilateral 
sanctions contend that such sanctions violate the customary international 
law principle of state sovereignty, which is enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter.181 Likewise, free trade advocates argue that general 
human rights sanctions against a member nation run counter to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO agreement.182 Also, 
activists within the human rights community question the promotion of 
civil and political rights to the detriment of economic, social, and cultural 
rights.183 
1. Unless Accompanied by Forcible Measures, the U.S. Unilateral 
Sanctions to Promote Human Rights Norms Do Not Violate the 
State Sovereignty Principle 
The primary question arising from the interaction between unilateral 
sanctions and international law is this: Do the unilateral sanctions violate 
the state sovereignty principle protected under the United Nations Charter 
and customary international law? The state sovereignty principle is one of 
nonintervention, which recognizes the right of states to be free from 
foreign interference in matters of purely domestic concern.184 In the 
 
 
 181. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary 
International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 19 (2000). Contra Cleveland, supra note 49, at 49–56. 
 182. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights—Past, Present, and Future, 6 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 797, 822–30 (2003) (analyzing the relationship between the GATT/WTO agreement 
and the international law of human rights by focusing on the permissibility of imposing trade sanctions 
against nations that commit violations of international human rights). 
 183. Amy Howlett, Getting “Smart”: Crafting Economic Sanctions That Respect All Human 
Rights, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1216–22 (2004) (presenting the controversy within the human 
rights community regarding the role that economic sanctions play in jeopardizing and strengthening 
international human rights law). 
 184. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (providing “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state . . .”). 
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Burmese sanctions context, the critical question is: Do the U.S. 
comprehensive sanctions, by attempting to coerce political change in 
Myanmar, constitute unlawful intervention into Myanmar’s domestic 
affairs? The answer is most likely “no.” 
Critics of the U.S. sanctions against Myanmar contend that interfering 
with the Myanmar economy to bring about a major behavioral change 
within the government amounts to unlawful intervention into Burmese 
domestic politics.185 In order to protect state sovereignty, customary 
international law has historically prohibited forcible or dictatorial 
intervention by a state in the domestic affairs of another state.186 However, 
due to the increased economic interdependence between nations, non-
forcible economic coercion achieves the same objectives as forcible or 
dictatorial interference and ultimately results in a powerful state dictating 
the domestic policies of a weaker state.187 As such, economic pressure 
applied by the sender country to induce policy and behavioral changes 
within the target country and its government amounts to intervention 
whether or not force is used.  
Proponents of the Burmese sanctions, on the other hand, could raise a 
number of arguments. First, the U.S. sanctions against Myanmar are 
consistent with the United Nations Charter.188 It is not disputed that the 
United Nations Charter recognizes the principle of state sovereignty; 
however, Article 2(7) is limited to actions by the United Nations—not by 
its individual member states.189 Likewise, Article 2(4) bars the unilateral 
“threat or use of force,” not the unilateral imposition of non-forcible 
economic sanctions.190 Furthermore, the United Nations Charter authorizes 
 
 
 185. The meaning and nature of ‘intervention’ is significantly broadened under this argument; 
‘intervention’ encompasses both forcible and nonforcible interference into the domestic affairs of a 
foreign sovereign state. However, economic sanctions, unless accompanied by military measures, do 
not fit into the traditional mold of forcible interference.  
 186. Cleveland, supra note 49, at 53 (“Customary international law prohibits ‘intervention’ in the 
form of ‘forcible or dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state, calculated to 
impose certain conduct or consequences on that other state.’” (quoting Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW § 1, § 129 (9th ed. 1992)).  
 187. Positioned somewhere between diplomacy and warfare, economic sanctions were frequently 
utilized in place of military engagement. Although the promotion of human rights through economic 
sanctions might warrant an exception to the state sovereignty principle, there is no such exception in 
international law; economic sanctions constitute interference into the domestic affairs of another state.  
 188. Cleveland, supra note 49, at 50–52 (arguing that unilateral sanctions may be adopted 
consistent with the United Nations Charter). 
 189. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
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the Security Council to impose multilateral economic sanctions in order to 
preserve the peace and security of the international system.191 
Second, customary international law does not bar the United States 
from using economic coercion to promote human rights in Myanmar.192 A 
long history of economic statecraft in international relations, coupled with 
frequent U.S. use of unilateral sanctions for a variety of purposes, suggest 
that there is no customary international law norm against the use of 
unilateral sanctions.193 Likewise, customary international law does not 
place any restrictions on a state’s right to trade with another state.194 
Moreover, the customary international law principle of nonintervention 
does not apply because economic coercion falls short of the forcible or 
dictatorial standard.195  
Finally, protection of human rights is a matter of international concern 
and not limited to domestic discretion; the United Nations Charter creates 
a legal obligation on member states not to commit human rights 
violations.196 
 
 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”) (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. art. 41 (“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations.”) (emphasis added); see also id. art. 39 (“The Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression 
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 43 to maintain or restore international peace and security.”).  
 192. Cleveland, supra note 49, at 52–56 (documenting arguments that unilateral sanctions are 
consistent with customary international law). 
 193. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 194. Cleveland, supra note 49, at 53 (“[E]very nation has a right to choose whether she will or 
will not trade with another, and on what conditions she is willing to do it; if one nation has for a time 
permitted another to come and trade in the country, she is at liberty, whenever she thinks proper, to 
prohibit that commerce—to restrain it—to subject it to certain regulations; and the people who before 
carried it on cannot complain of injustice.” (citing EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. I, ch. 
VIII, § 94 (Chitty ed., 1866) (1758)). 
 195. Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 405, 413 (1985) (arguing that economic coercion constitutes forcible and dictatorial 
interference only when “the objective of the coercion is to liquidate an existing state or to reduce that 
state to the position of a satellite”) (emphasis in original).  
 196. U.N. Charter, art. 55 (“[T]he United Nations shall promote: (a) higher standards of living, 
full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; (b) solutions of 
international economic, social, health, and related problems; [and] (c) universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.”); id. art. 56 (“All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action 
in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”); see 
Cleveland, supra note 49, at 52 (“Even if [economic sanctions imposed for human rights purposes] 
were to violate the nonintervention norm, they may still constitute an acceptable use of nonforcible 
countermeasures to retaliate against violations of international human rights.”); see also Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 
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2. The U.S. Comprehensive Sanctions Against Myanmar Are Most 
Likely Consistent with the GATT/WTO System 
The U.S. unilateral economic sanctions to promote human rights norms 
in Myanmar raise additional questions concerning compliance with the 
GATT/WTO system. The recent trend to promote fundamental human 
rights through trade restrictions has been challenged by developing 
countries and trade advocates for impinging on the comparative advantage 
of developing states and their establishment of disguised protectionist 
measures that conflict with the basic principles of the GATT/WTO 
system.197 More importantly, compliance of human rights-related trade 
restrictions with the international trade system has profound consequences 
on the enforcement of international human rights: if the GATT/WTO 
system prohibits imposition of economic sanctions in response to human 
rights violations, then the international human rights community would 
most likely be deprived of its most frequently used, long-standing, and 
highly regarded mechanism of enforcement for human rights abuses. 
The GATT/WTO provisions that are relevant to the human rights 
situation in Myanmar include the prohibitions provided in Articles I, III, 
and XI of the GATT/WTO Agreement and the corresponding exceptions 
set forth in Articles XX and XXI.198 Article I’s “most favored nations” 
clause is a rule of non-discrimination requiring any beneficial treatment 
given to the products of one country—whether a WTO member or not—to 
be given to the like products of all WTO members.199 Similarly, Article 
III’s “national treatment” provision prohibits discrimination between 
domestic and imported products.200 Article XI prohibits any quota or any 
 
 
83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 31–34 (1989) (arguing that economic intervention in foreign states for human 
rights purposes does not violate the nonintervention norm). 
 197. See Vázquez, supra note 182, for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the 
international law of trade and the international law of human rights. 
 198. See infra notes 199–211 and accompanying text. 
 199. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT 1947] (as amended and incorporated by reference into General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter GATT 1994]) 
(Article I, paragraph 1, provides: “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all 
other contracting parties.”). 
 200. Id. art. III(2) (“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.”). 
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quantitative restrictions on imports or exports.201 Conversely, Article XX 
enumerates exceptions to the general obligations and permits some 
otherwise prohibited measures so long as “such measures are not applied 
in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.”202 Last, Article XXI provides 
a national security exception, which seems to contemplate an unspoken 
judicial deference of sorts.203 
Although the legality of human rights-based trade restrictions has not 
been adjudicated in the GATT/WTO dispute resolution system, the U.S. 
unilateral sanctions against Myanmar would most likely be found to 
comply with the guidelines of the GATT/WTO system. Surprisingly 
enough, Myanmar is one of the original twenty-three contracting members 
to GATT ’47.204 Likewise, the weight of authority supports the conclusion 
that the U.S. unilateral economic sanctions banning trade with Myanmar 
violate Articles I, III, and XI. However, the U.S. trade restriction against 
Myanmar is most likely to be valid under the GATT/WTO system if it 
falls within one of the enumerated exceptions in Article XX, or is 
authorized under Article XXI’s national security exception. In addition, 
supporters of the U.S. sanctions could argue that nothing in the text or the 
negotiating history of GATT suggests an intention by the contracting 
parties to take away the ability of states to impose unilateral economic 
measures in response to human rights violations that are otherwise allowed 
under customary international law.205 
Supporters of the U.S. sanctions argue that these measures fall within 
Article XX’s exceptions for public morals and/or human life or health.206 
In addition to overcoming the obvious extraterritoriality problems,207 
 
 
 201. Id. art. XI(1) (“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of 
any other contracting party.”). 
 202. Id. art. XX. 
 203. Id. art. XXI (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . (b) to prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests . . . (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations . . . .”). 
 204. Id. pmbl. 
 205. Cleveland, supra note 49, at 65–69. 
 206. GATT 47, supra note 199, art. XX(1). These exceptions include measures that are “(a) 
necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . .” 
Id. 
 207. To overcome the extraterritoriality concerns, one might argue that international human rights 
obligations are universal in nature and that they are independently binding on states. However, it 
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proponents of the U.S. sanctions must also satisfy the chapeau’s 
requirement that the measures “not [be] applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail.”208 Professor Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez argues that the United States would have a hard time justifying 
that its sanctions apply equally to all countries with human rights 
violations, pointing out the divergent approaches to economic engagement 
towards China as compared to Cuba or Myanmar.209 
Additionally, reliance on the Article XXI(b) exception for essential 
security interests may be permissible under extraordinary 
circumstances;210 arguably, this includes the human rights situation in 
Myanmar. Nevertheless, the lack of judicial interpretation, coupled with 
the potential self-judging nature of the exception, raises concerns about the 
likelihood of abuse. Furthermore, it is unclear how the alleged human 
rights abuses in Myanmar relate to the essential national security interests 
of the United States.211  
3. The U.S. Comprehensive Sanctions Against Myanmar Promote Civil 
and Political Rights to the Detriment of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights 
The controversy between the Burmese sanctions and the international 
human rights system212 concerns whether the U.S. comprehensive 
sanctions against Myanmar exclusively promote civil and political rights 
to the detriment of economic, social, and cultural rights. The international 
human rights doctrine is structured to protect two categories of rights: (1) 
 
 
remains a point of contention whether GATT authorizes measures established to protect the morals 
and health of persons in the exporting states or elsewhere (i.e., target countries) or whether the 
exception is limited to measures that protect those within the importing states (i.e., sender countries). 
See Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 689, 695 
(distinguishing between the “inwardly-directed” measures designed to protect the morals or health of 
people within the implementing state and “outwardly-directed” measures designed to protect the 
morals or health of people outside the implementing state).  
 208. GATT 47, supra note 199, art. XX. 
 209. Vázquez, supra note 182, at 823. 
 210. GATT 47, supra note 199, art. XXI(b). 
 211. China’s recent economic and political takeover of Myanmar seems more of a threat to U.S. 
national security interests and to regional security.  
 212. The international law of human rights developed in reaction to the lack of human rights 
protection in the domestic laws of various countries. The international law of human rights is created 
primarily through (1) international treaties; (2) jus cogens norms and customary international law 
principles that have evolved through treaties, state practice, and efforts by nongovernmental actors; 
and is supplemented by (3) general principles that are common to and found in the major legal systems 
of the world.  
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civil and political rights, and (2) economic, social and cultural rights.213 
Civil and political rights are generally thought of as negative rights—
freedom from governmental interference with individual autonomy 
beyond what is required in the exercise of government’s police power.214 
Economic, social, and cultural rights, on the other hand, are considered to 
be positive rights—individual entitlements which impose an obligation on 
the government, as a matter of right, to promote economic and social 
conditions that are deemed essential to human dignity and to make 
negative rights meaningful.215 
The principle human rights norms are enshrined in the International 
Bill of Rights: (1) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and (3) the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).216 The Universal Declaration was adopted as a statement of 
principles, and hence lacks normative force.217 The principle rights 
protected in the Universal Declaration, however, are codified into binding 
treaty law through two supporting covenants: the ICCPR218 and the 
 
 
 213. See infra notes 214–20 and accompanying text. 
 214. Civil and political rights expressed in human rights documents are natural rights—rights of 
every individual in the state of nature—that are retained by each individual to some extent after 
instituting a government to secure these rights in a liberal state. For example, they include the rights to 
life, liberty, property, and autonomy.  
 215. Economic, social, and cultural rights expressed in human rights documents are individual 
entitlements, closely identified with the welfare state ideology which obligates the government to 
promote and secure the welfare of the individual. For example, they include the right to education, the 
right to work, the right to social security, and the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of the individual.  
 216. The International Bill of Rights consists of (1) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/10 (Dec. 12, 1948) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]; (2) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; and (3) the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 217. The question of whether the Universal Declaration is legally binding under international law 
remains somewhat controversial. Proponents argue that even if the Universal Declaration itself is not 
legally binding, at least some of the principles contained in it have attained the status of customary 
international law because (1) the Universal Declaration is an authoritative interpretation of the human 
rights provisions in the U.N. Charter, and (2) some of its principles were already legally binding 
through other international agreements. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. SCHECHTER, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL 
CONFERENCES 20 (2005). 
 218. The ICCPR requires member states to refrain from actions that would violate the civil and 
political rights of individuals—freedoms and immunities which a member state can respect by leaving 
the individual alone. See ICCPR, supra note 216, art. 2(1) (“Each state party . . . undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
. . . without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”); see also supra note 208 and 
accompanying text (describing negative rights). 
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ICESCR;219 the former protecting civil and political rights and the latter 
promoting economic, social, and cultural rights. Although the United 
States has ratified the ICCPR with reservations, it has not ratified the 
ICESCR. Consequently, U.S. conviction for promoting economic, social, 
and cultural rights is lacking when compared to its promotion of civil and 
political rights.220 
Proponents of the Burmese sanctions argue that the sanctions promote 
the growth of international human rights norms.221 International norms are 
defined and refined when the international community responds to alleged 
breaches of international law.222 When the United States imposed 
comprehensive sanctions in response to political repression in Myanmar, it 
reinforced its commitment to international human rights norms by voicing 
its distaste for such behavior. If U.S. allies and the international 
community joined in the effort, the sanctions would serve to further refine 
the international human rights norms that Myanmar has allegedly violated. 
Furthermore, if the Burmese government relents to some of the sanctions’ 
demands, it would begin the process of internalizing international human 
rights norms into its domestic law.223 Finally, the proponents of the 
Burmese sanctions argue that the sanctions brought about international 
 
 
 219. The ICESCR, on the other hand, requires member states to take affirmative action to advance 
economic, social, and cultural rights of individuals—entitlements that a member state is obligated to 
provide to individuals. See ICESCR, supra note 216, art. 2(1) (“Each state party . . . undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized . . . by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.”); see also supra note 209 and accompanying text (describing positive rights). 
 220. Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations Under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 158 (1987). 
 221. See Howlett, supra note 183, at 1220–22 (surveying the literature on the relationship between 
economic sanctions and the growth of international human rights norms); see also Cleveland, supra 
note 49, at 19 (stating that the international responses to human rights conditions in Myanmar “form 
part of a collective effort on the part of the international community to refine existing human rights 
norms and to promote improved human rights conditions and democratic governance in Burma”). 
 222. Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function: How International 
Law Is Made, 6 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1980), reprinted in Myres S. McDougal & W. 
Michael Reisman, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF 
THE WORLD COMMUNITY 84 (1981).  
 223. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 295 (2002) (“[T]he United States government must promote democracy and human 
rights worldwide—including at home—both as ends in themselves and as critical means to a safer, 
healthier, more prosperous process of globalization. The United States should support the growing 
globalization of human freedom, not just as an end in itself, but also because more global freedom 
provides needed and humane solutions to modern global problems, such as environmental degradation, 
international crime and terrorism, transborder trafficking and refugee flows, and the spread of global 
AIDS.”). 
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attention, pressure, and condemnation against the Burmese military 
junta.224 
Opponents of the Burmese sanctions do not dispute the benefits 
conferred by the U.S. unilateral sanctions in promoting civil and political 
rights. Instead, those who oppose the sanctions contend that hardships 
imposed on Burmese civilians through the unilateral sanctions rise to 
violations of their economic, social, and cultural rights.225 Mass layoffs of 
the textile workers in Myanmar interfere with their right to work. 
Likewise, reductions in government spending and foreign development 
assistance reduce the resources available for education and healthcare, 
further depriving the Burmese civilians of their rights to education and 
healthcare.226 Moreover, promotion of civil and political rights to the 
detriment of economic, social, and cultural rights undermines the 
importance of the latter category of rights in the international human rights 
system. The frequent U.S. practice to exclusively promote civil and 
political rights fosters the international norm that it is acceptable to violate 
the economic, social, and cultural rights of the target country’s civilians so 
long as civil and political goals are achieved.227 
B. Humanitarian Assessment of the Efficacy of the U.S. Sanctions Against 
Myanmar 
It is often assumed and accepted that economic hardship will befall the 
people of the target country when economic sanctions are imposed.228 Few 
 
 
 224. Cleveland, supra note 49, at 19. 
 225. In Myanmar, the impact of the U.S. sanctions is reflected in loss of employment among the 
general population, reduction in foreign economic aid, and an excuse to reduce already minimal 
government spending. See supra Part III. However, the causal relationship between the U.S. sanctions 
and the Burmese government’s inability to promote economic, social, and cultural rights is difficult to 
trace and indirect at best. Nevertheless, unlike the protection of civil and political rights, promotion of 
economic, social, and cultural rights requires the Burmese government to work in concert with the 
international community.  
 226. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 216, art. 6 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living 
by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.”); 
id. art. 12 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”); id. art. 13 (“The States 
Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education.”). 
 227. Howlett, supra note 183, at 1228 (“Because economic sanctions are a form of state practice, 
when the United States imposes economic sanctions and fails to take into account or even try to 
prevent dire civilian consequences that implicate [economic, social, and cultural] rights, it is 
weakening these rights. Such actions foster the growth of the idea that [economic, social, and cultural] 
rights are irrelevant, and that jeopardizing [economic, social, and cultural] rights for civil and political 
goals is perfectly acceptable.”). 
 228. Because of diminished trade, target industries might suffer, leading to job loss, down-turn in 
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have addressed, however, what should be done when economic hardship 
morphs into a humanitarian crisis or when the imposition of sanctions 
makes worse a burgeoning humanitarian crisis. The critical question in 
assessing the efficacy of unilateral sanctions along humanitarian lines is 
this: if one could predict that the sanctions would result in a humanitarian 
crisis, would the sanctions still be appropriate? This may be especially 
relevant in target countries where the respective governments are not 
accountable to their civilian populations, such that economic hardship 
quickly spirals into humanitarian catastrophe.229 I argue that unilateral 
sanctions employed in the face of a humanitarian crisis run counter to the 
very goal of the sanctions—to help the citizens of the target country who 
cannot help themselves. 
The U.S.-led sanctions against pre-invasion Iraq, for example, have 
been widely criticized for their disparate impact on the Iraqi civilian 
population.230 Iraq, prior to sanctions, was a nation with immense natural 
resources, a strong middle class, and excellent health care and education 
systems.231 At the same time though, the people of Iraq lived under the 
tyranny of Saddam Hussein, who terrorized his people with mass killings 
and brutal policing.232 The Iraqi population shouldered the impact of the 
sanctions. Economic hardship turned into a humanitarian crisis as the 
struggles of the Iraqi civilians were compounded further by the choices 
that Saddam Hussein made and the mismanagement of the oil-for-food 
program. Essential infrastructure was destroyed, and food and health care 
became scarce for a large portion of the population.233 Nevertheless, 
Saddam Hussein’s regime remained in power; it took a full-scale military 
invasion by the United States and its coalition to topple Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. 
Economic hardships induced by sanctions invariably result in the 
deterioration of the public infrastructure, which makes the target country 
 
 
local economies, and even a drop in the standard of living; see also supra notes 39–42 and 
accompanying text. 
 229. This leads to a paradox: the sanctions are employed mainly because a majority of the 
governments of target countries are not accountable to their constituencies.  
 230. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 227–29 and accompanying 
text. 
 231. Eric Hoskins, The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq, in 
POLITICAL GAIN AND CIVILIAN PAIN 91 (Thomas G. Weiss et al. eds., 1997). 
 232. Human Rights Watch, Whatever Happened to the Iraqi Kurds? (1991), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/iraq (last visited May 4, 2008) (reporting Saddam Hussein’s gassing 
of Kurdish civilians at Halabja, where tens of thousands of civilians were estimated to have been 
killed). 
 233. Hoskins, supra note 231, at 106–08, 113–16. 
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more susceptible to a humanitarian crisis. Additionally, imposition of 
sanctions worsens an already escalating humanitarian problem within a 
target country. While it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between 
economic hardship and a humanitarian crisis, other times the distinction is 
clear; this is especially true in the example of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.234 
Myanmar, like many other developing countries outside of Africa, is 
beginning to battle such an epidemic.235 In addition to exacting economic 
hardship on the Burmese people at large, the U.S. comprehensive 
sanctions further fuel the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar by preventing 
necessary intervention programs and funds from reaching the people.236 
Experts in the public health community have predicted that the 
infection rate of HIV in Myanmar has reached a tipping point; without 
intervention, the rates will increase exponentially from this point 
forward.237 This fact has alarmed the world health community; in 2002, the 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) developed a joint program between the 
 
 
 234. Jenni Fredriksson-Bass & Annabel Kanabus, HIV & AIDS in Botswana, available at 
http://www.avert.org/aidsbotswana.htm (last visited May 4, 2008) (reporting that the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Botswana has surpassed crisis levels with nearly 25% of the population infected with HIV 
and only limited treatment options available). The average life expectancy has fallen from 65 to less 
than 40 and 120,000 children have lost at least one parent to the epidemic. Id. In his 2001 address to 
the UN, the President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, said “we are threatened with extinction . . . .” Id 
What makes the HIV/AIDS crisis in Botswana even more tragic is that it could have been at least 
partially mitigated with earlier intervention. The first case of HIV in Botswana was recorded in 1985, 
but it was not until 1997 that a multi-tiered approach was implemented, which finally began to make 
an impact on the spread of HIV. Id. 
 235. Joint Programme for HIV/AIDS in Myanmar 2003–2005, Joint Programme for HIV/AIDS: 
Revised with Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, Mar. 31, 2004, at 5 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Joint Programme] (“New estimates from the Ministry of Health show 180,000 people infected with 
HIV, compared to estimates of 20,000 in 2003, while UNAIDS estimates a range of 170,000 to 
420,000. Trends in official surveillance data from 2001 show increasing rates of HIV infection among 
key sentinel groups: sexually transmitted infection (STI) patients (20.5%), commercial sex workers 
(CSW) (33.5%), blood donors (1.1%), new military recruits (2.2%), and pregnant women (2.2%), with 
considerable in-country regional variation.”); see Jon Cohen, The Politics of Prevalence, SCIENCE, 
Sept. 19, 2003, at 1652 [hereinafter Cohen, Prevalence] (discussing the discrepancies when analyzing 
the HIV prevalence in Myanmar); see also ICG, HIV/AIDS CRISIS, supra note 174, at 2.  
 236. Putting aside the disagreements in analyzing the prevalence of HIV infections, the HIV/AIDS 
problem in Myanmar could threaten national security, devastate the economy and undermine the 
already weak capacity of the government to provide adequate health care. When the so far silent 
epidemic finally shows its face, the devastation will be immense: households will be deprived of 
breadwinners and children will lose their parents. An even more damaging consequence will be the 
effect on the morale of the population, as the hardest hit communities will invariably lose hope. For a 
detailed discussion of political threats to humanitarian aid delivery in Myanmar, see INT’L CRISIS 
GROUP (ICG), MYANMAR: NEW THREATS TO HUMANITARIAN AID, ASIA BRIEFING NO. 58, Dec. 8, 
2006, available at http://crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4565&l=1 [hereinafter ICG, THREATS].  
 237. The Government’s estimate of 180,000 people living with HIV is significantly lower than 
that of the UNAIDS’ estimate, which ranges from of over 170,000–420,000. Either way, these 
numbers will multiply rapidly if appropriate provisions are not implemented immediately. See ICG, 
HIV/AIDS CRISIS, supra note 174, at 1. 
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United States, international non-governmental organizations, and the 
Burmese government for the purpose of fighting HIV/AIDS in 
Myanmar.238 Despite rhetoric stating that humanitarian aid is independent 
of the economic sanctions, however, the greatest obstacle to fighting 
HIV/AIDS in Myanmar is politics. The United States cancelled the 
program before it began as a form of protest to the latest detainment of 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.239 
Similarly, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
(Global Fund)—the single biggest aid initiative in Myanmar in twenty 
years—has also recently pulled out of Myanmar because it came under 
intense pressure from the U.S. Congress and U.S.-based advocacy 
groups.240 Although the Global Fund maintains that its August 2005 
withdrawal was motivated by technical considerations only,241 the U.S. 
Congress exerted pressure on the Global Fund in stages. First came a letter 
from Senators Judd Greg, Mitch McConnell, and Sam Brownback to the 
executive director of the Global Fund criticizing the Global Fund and the 
UNDP, and requesting to “withhold the disbursement of additional funds 
to [Myanmar].”242 Then when the Global Fund refused, Congress 
threatened to withdraw about $50 million of U.S. core funding for the 
UNDP through an amendment introduced by Senator McConnell to the 
2006–2007 Foreign Appropriations Bill.243 At the same time, U.S.-based 
 
 
 238. Jon Cohen, The Collaboration That Almost Was, SCIENCE, Sept. 19, 2003, at 1654 
(discussing the cancellation of a collaboration between U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), NGOs, and the Myanmar government). 
 239. Id. at 1654. 
 240. For a detailed account of the politics behind the Global Fund withdrawal, see ICG, THREATS, 
supra note 236, at 12–14.  
 241. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Termination of Grants to 
Myanmar, 1 (Aug. 18, 2005), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/media_center/press/pr_ 
050819_factsheet.pdf (last visited May 4, 2008) (citing government interference as a major factor in 
the decision to terminate a five year, $98.4 million funding project to Myanmar). 
 242. ICG, THREATS, supra note 236, at 12 (citing a letter to the Executive Director of the Global 
Fund, dated on September 28, 2004, and signed by Judd Greg, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions; Mitch McConnell, Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations; and Sam Brownback, Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on East Asia and 
Pacific Affairs).  
 243. Id. at 12.  
In early 2005, Senator Mitch McConnell introduced an amendment to the 2006–2007 Foreign 
Appropriations Bill, which threatened to withdraw about $50 million—roughly half—of U.S. 
core funding for the agency if it failed to certify that all its programs in Myanmar, including 
those it administered for others such as the Global Fund, provided “no financial, political, or 
military benefit, including the provision of goods, services, or per diems, to the SPDC or any 
agency or entity of, or affiliated with, the SPDC.” Although the bill did not specifically 
mention the Global Fund, it was a thinly veiled attempt to force UNDP to withdraw as the 
principal recipient of its money, a step which likely would have led to termination of the 
programs. 
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advocacy groups led by the Open Society Institute put pressure on the 
Global Fund to introduce “tighter restrictions on the use of funds,” to a 
point that compromised program effectiveness and seemed in breach of its 
own regulations.244 Thus, the Burmese people face rising HIV infection 
rates without much help from the international community; and because 
antiretroviral drugs are not widely available in Myanmar, every case is 
fatal.245 
In relating the HIV/AIDS crisis back to sanctions, discussion of the 
appropriateness of using the suffering of the people of a target country as a 
vehicle for change is important. If one could predict that a humanitarian 
crisis brought on by sanctions would in fact be minimal and bring about 
political changes in the target country, such sanctions might be 
justifiable.246 In Myanmar, however, it is likely that sanctions have 
decreased the standard of living and it is possible that this has increased 
unrest in the country. At the same time, are the U.S. comprehensive 
sanctions fueling the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar and putting the 
civilians at risk for “extinction,” like in Botswana?247 If so, will the deaths 
of a large number of Burmese people and the orphaning of hundreds of 
thousands of Burmese children help strengthen the resistance movement in 
a country like Myanmar? 
Predictions of the possible humanitarian effects of sanctions—both 
positive and negative—should be considered if the sanctions are to have 
any hope of succeeding. In Myanmar, such effects, and especially a 
humanitarian crisis, can weaken the ability of the Burmese people to rise 
up against the military junta. Likewise, an HIV/AIDS epidemic can 
generate political backlash in the United States when the military 
government in Myanmar shifts the blame for the epidemic to the 
sanctions. Even more, continuation of sanctions may provide opportunities 
for repressive governments to tighten their grip on an even more 
vulnerable population. Lastly, holding humanitarian aid hostage to further 
 
 
Id. 
 244. Id. at 12–13 (citing a memorandum dated September 24, 2004, from Aryeh Neier (President 
of the Open Society Institute) to Brad Herbert (Chief of Operations of the Global Fund) insisting that 
“none of [Global Fund] programs should be conducted by or with financial assistance to the ruling 
military junta or government-organized NGOs”). 
 245. See UNAIDS, Fund for HIV/AIDS in Myanmar: Annual Progress Report 2006 (2007), 
available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2007/fham_report_en.pdf (last visited May 28, 2008). 
 246. In South Africa, for example, economic hardship caused by sanctions may in fact have 
helped to destabilize the political system, leading to the dramatic dissolution of the white minority 
government and national democratic elections.  
 247. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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a political goal, especially in face of humanitarian crisis, is 
unconscionable. 
CONCLUSION 
The contemporary debate over U.S. unilateral sanctions practice is a 
dispute about the means—whether unilateral sanctions are the most 
effective means to coerce foreign governments to modify their unsavory 
policies. Those in favor of unilateral sanctions argue that they are low-cost 
remedies for the unacceptable behavior of foreign governments, and that 
they offer an immediate response to domestic demands for action.248 
Opponents of unilateral sanctions, on the other hand, contend that their 
costs outweigh their effectiveness and that they can lead to 
counterproductive outcomes.249 The consensus of the literature on the 
efficacy of unilateral sanctions is that they are not an effective tool of 
foreign policy.250 Yet, since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a 
renaissance in the use of unilateral sanctions, giving rise to an apparent 
paradox. 
In this Article, I analyzed the efficacy of unilateral sanctions in the 
context of the U.S. unilateral sanctions against the military government of 
Myanmar. Starting with Professor Hufbauer’s framework of political and 
economic factors as a guidepost, I introduced the additional lenses needed 
to view each episode in a sanctions-specific manner, in order to develop a 
 
 
 248. See ASKARI ET AL., supra note 4, at 65–66 (citing Jesse Helms, What Sanctions Epidemic?, 
78 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1999)). Advocates of the unilateral sanctions argue the following: sanctions allow 
the sender country to signal disapproval of the target country’s policies without resorting to military 
action, the threat of sanctions can be a powerful tool in trade negotiations, export controls block 
transfer of sensitive technologies to dangerous countries, sanctions serve as an expression of moral 
outrage and reassure the world that the United States will stand by its international commitments, and 
economic hardship in the target country will lead to a subsequent political and behavioral change.  
 249. Id. Opponents of the unilateral sanctions argue the following: sanctions hurt the innocent 
citizens of the target country and further solidify the power of the authoritarian leaders, sanctions can 
be bypassed through reexport from third countries, loss of exports to target countries imposes 
significant economic costs on the senders’ citizens through lost output and jobs, loss of imports from 
target countries imposes higher costs on businesses in the sender country and affords fewer choices to 
consumers, and sanctions rarely cause the target country to modify its policies. Id. at 66 (citing Gary 
Clyde Hufbauer & Reginald Jones, Sanctions-Happy USA, WASH. POST, July 12, 1998, at C1).  
 250. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also HUFBAUER ET AL., SANCTIONS 
RECONSIDERED, supra note 3, at 95 (reporting that only thirty-four percent of the sanctions in their 
study are deemed successful); ASKARI ET AL., supra note 4, at 67 (“No matter how well intentioned 
and no matter how just the cause, U.S. unilateral economic sanctions are an ineffective policy 
approach for bringing about policy changes in other countries and have poor prospects for success.”); 
PREEG, supra note 28, at 2–3 (“[B]roadly based unilateral sanctions during the 1990s . . . have been 
almost entirely ineffective in achieving their intended foreign policy objectives while having a 
substantial adverse impact on other U.S. foreign policy and commercial interests.”). 
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better understanding of how each of these parts—economic, political, 
social, legal, and humanitarian—fit together in any given sanctions 
experience, and to use that new framework to analyze the Burmese 
sanctions. On paper, promotion of democracy and human rights in 
Myanmar seems like the right thing to do. The United States, as a world 
leader, ought to fight for the rights of the oppressed in Myanmar and 
elsewhere. In practice, however, it is becoming apparent that the U.S. 
sanctions in Myanmar do more harm than good while attempting to 
achieve their desired goals. Our duty, then, is to stop and ask what other 
means are available to help the Burmese help themselves. 
The U.S. unilateral sanctions against Myanmar will most likely fail in 
achieving their foreign policy goals. First, the sanctions were never 
intended to succeed; rather, they were imposed primarily to satisfy the 
demands of the domestic human rights activists and to further perpetuate 
U.S. moral convictions on the global stage—all without really having to 
jeopardize U.S. national interests. Those who favor the sanctions have 
determined by themselves that the suffering imposed on Burmese civilians 
is an acceptable sacrifice in the name of democracy and human rights.  
Second, the lofty goals sought by the Burmese sanctions make success 
improbable. The sanctions are too inflexible, requiring the ruling military 
junta to give up power, elevate its political nemesis into power, and fade 
away into the background. To be successful, we must promote democracy 
and human rights in Myanmar—a country with a deep political divide and 
very little democratic infrastructure—gradually and through compromise. 
Third, the comprehensive nature of the Burmese sanctions has kept the 
United States’ western allies from joining, thus depriving the cause of 
much needed multilateral support. Even worse, the Burmese sanctions 
have alienated U.S. allies in the region and strengthened China’s hand in 
Myanmar. The ASEAN has continually argued that the sanctions may 
precipitate economic collapse and political violence in Myanmar, 
destabilizing the regional economy and security.  
Fourth, Myanmar’s Asian neighbors undermine the effectiveness of the 
U.S. unilateral sanctions through their continued, and in some cases 
increased, trade with the military regime. China has become Myanmar’s 
most important trading partner, filling the void left by the withdrawal of 
U.S. commercial interests. The ASEAN member countries continue to 
pursue a policy of constructive engagement in order to counterbalance the 
growing Chinese influence in Myanmar. Meanwhile, the sanctions hurt the 
short- and long-term commercial interests of the United States in 
Myanmar. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD 513 
 
 
 
 
Fifth, the prolonged duration of the Burmese sanctions, without any 
significant improvement in human rights conditions, calls for a 
reassessment of the current sanctions policy. The military junta, in 
addition to blaming its own internal economic failures on the sanctions, 
has developed mechanisms for evasion. The time has come for the United 
States to reassess its unilateral sanctions practice towards Myanmar by 
designing and implementing creative solutions.  
Sixth, the costs of the sanctions are shouldered by the Burmese civilian 
population. The sanctions deepen the preexisting inequalities in Myanmar 
between those who are affiliated with the military and those who are not. 
More importantly, the sanctions deprive the Burmese people of important 
Western political ideas about freedom, democracy, and human rights, 
which normally accompany trade with the United States.  
Last, the impending threat of an HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar, 
coupled with the detrimental effects of the economic sanctions on 
humanitarian aid delivery, cautions against the continuation of the 
sanctions. Instead, increased humanitarian aid from the international 
community—without any benchmark preconditions—for the Burmese 
people, especially in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, could serve as a vehicle 
to reopen dialogue with the military government and bring about social 
change through humanitarian engagement. 
The impact of the sanctions, once imposed, is long lasting because of 
the stigma attached to them. In the case of Myanmar, it is hard to remove 
because the positions on both sides have become so entrenched and 
inflexible. The U.S. sanctions have shut the door on Myanmar at a time 
when increased international cooperation and diplomacy, rather than 
external pressure, was needed to finally open up once-isolated society. 
Likewise, the U.S. sanctions have frozen in place a political deadlock that 
cannot resolve itself. The bottom line is this: the U.S. sanctions may 
provide moral support for the pro-democracy movement and make us feel 
good about having done something, but they do not do any good at all for 
Myanmar and the people of Myanmar. 
A more flexible diplomacy is needed for Myanmar to move forward 
and the U.S. must start by reassessing its current unilateral sanctions 
policy against the military government of Myanmar. To do so effectively, 
the United States must lead the international community in reformulating 
practical benchmarks that can realistically be achieved by the military 
government of Myanmar. Likewise, the United States must be flexible 
enough to gradually withdraw its sanctions policies upon the Myanmar 
government’s demonstrated progress on political and economic reforms. 
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Regardless of whether the Myanmar government is able to institute 
suitable political and economic reforms geared towards gradual removal of 
sanctions, the United States must provide sustained leadership and 
mobilize international support to alleviate economic, social, and 
humanitarian conditions that inhibit progress in Myanmar. The United 
States must lead the international community to collectively engage 
Myanmar—this time through “humanitarian engagement for change.”251 
The United States has an opportunity to mobilize international and 
regional cooperation to engage the Myanmar government at a 
humanitarian level, especially in the aftermath of the September 2007 
protests and the Cyclone Nargis disaster. By engaging at a humanitarian 
level, we reaffirm our commitment to help and restore hope to the people 
of Myanmar. In restoring hope, we help plant the seeds of empowerment 
and change. Likewise, the international funding institutions must reopen 
channels of funding as a first step in furtherance of this goal. It is critical 
that the Burmese people receive increased international aid, at least 
comparable to that of their neighbors, so that the Burmese people can start 
to rebuild the public sectors gutted by years of conflict and neglect.  
 
 
 251. The goal of humanitarian engagement for change should be to alleviate economic, social, and 
humanitarian conditions that inhibit progress in Myanmar through longer-term initiatives aimed at 
building the capacity of the state, fostering the emergence of a broader civil society and more inclusive 
political process, and promoting respect for essential individual and communal rights when addressing 
Myanmar’s development challenges. 
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ADDENDUM 
Neither a policy grounded in diplomatic isolation and punitive 
economic sanctions, as advocated by the West, nor an approach based on 
noninterference and constructive engagement, as championed by 
Myanmar’s neighbors, have brought about an end to the political deadlock 
in Myanmar. Instead, this uncoordinated and contradictory assortment of 
international responses to the need for political and economic change in 
Myanmar has helped perpetuate a crisis that requires a coordinated 
intervention and meaningful support from the international community. 
The people of Myanmar, who have suffered greatly during this time, 
deserve a better life, and their dream of a better future ought to compel all 
stakeholders to have the courage and energy to move away from their 
entrenched positions in favor of a more pragmatic approach. 
The time for action is now. Amidst the monsoon rains of August and 
September of 2007, what started out as sporadic protests against the 
increase in fuel prices in Myanmar gained momentum and transformed 
into a countrywide, antigovernment movement. Spearheaded by the 
Buddhist Sangha—the moral center and the only functioning institution 
outside the Tatmadaw—peaceful demonstrators have called for national 
reconciliation; inclusive political processes; and improvements in social, 
political, and economic conditions.252 The United States should seize this 
rare opportunity to empower the people of Myanmar and promote 
meaningful political change. 
Yet, in the face of the Burmese people’s heroic stand for freedom, 
President Bush offered before the United Nations General Assembly only 
more sanctions, intensifying the already existing visa bans and financial 
restrictions against the generals.253 Although this symbolic show of 
support may have fulfilled the Bush administration’s emotional need to do 
something, it may not do any good for the people of Myanmar. Such 
unilateral action stunts the diplomatic process needed to untangle a 
complicated and delicate political deadlock in Myanmar and further 
alienates a regime that has maintained its grip on power through isolation. 
The democratic forces for change inside Myanmar need assistance 
from the international community to succeed. However, international 
 
 
 252. For a detailed account of the protests and the subsequent crackdown, see Paulo Sérgio 
Pinheiro, U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Myanmar, Advance Edited Version, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/14 (Dec. 7, 2007).  
 253. Fareed Zakaria, Sleepwalking to Sanctions, Again, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2007, at 34; George 
W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2007). 
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pressure must come in its most effective form: collective action. The 
United States can do more to bring about a peaceful solution to this 
standoff, sustain the momentum for change, and promote democracy in 
Myanmar. While our emotional need to do something shapes our response 
to this recent crisis, we must be mindful of what is good for the Burmese 
people. 
Instead of acting alone, the United States should build an international 
coalition to formulate a collective response that condemns the regime’s 
violent repression of dissent and presses the regime for lasting political 
and economic reforms. Likewise, gathering support from other U.S. and 
EU allies on a common position may be more effective when trying to 
convince Myanmar’s neighbors to act. Furthermore, the United Nations 
Security Council may not be the most appropriate forum in which to take 
action, given that the last attempt to formulate a resolution there met a rare 
Sino-Russian double veto.254 Instead, the United States should put its full 
support behind the “good offices” of the United Nations Secretary-General 
to build a consensus among China, India, and ASEAN member countries 
to use their political and economic influence to encourage the military 
government in Myanmar to stem the tide of violence, foster a peaceful 
dialogue, and begin the process of national reconciliation.  
Myanmar’s neighbors should act immediately. Unexpected escalation 
of sporadic protests over fuel prices into a countrywide antigovernment 
movement may have come as a surprise to the ruling generals. Though the 
Burmese government acted violently and inexcusably in repressing the 
demonstrations, the level of relative restraint shown—compared with their 
violent response in 1988—and the decision to allow the United Nations 
special envoy to enter the country suggest that the regime may be open to 
dialogue under the right circumstances. Moreover, the need to generate 
political support for the recently completed national constitutional 
convention may motivate the military regime to listen. Coupled with the 
pressure exerted by the Myanmar people themselves, a common position 
from China, India, and ASEAN could encourage the military regime to 
implement lasting reforms. 
Although the United States has minimal political and economic 
leverage over the military regime, it is in a unique position to encourage 
Myanmar’s neighbors. First, it has significant influence over China, India, 
 
 
 254. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on 
Myanmar, Owing to Negative Votes by China, Russian Federation, U.N. Doc. SC/8939 (Jan. 12, 
2007). For a summary record of the meeting, see U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5619th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.5619 (Jan. 12, 2007). 
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and ASEAN—the countries that can most effectively influence the 
military regime in Myanmar. Second, the best interest of these countries is 
served by a peaceful and prosperous Myanmar that contributes to regional 
stability. Most importantly, the United States’ moral commitment to 
freedom resonates in Asia, especially among the people of Myanmar. In 
the long-term, we must again become an important player in the Burmese 
people’s struggle for freedom. 
That said, a number of foreign policy decisions may come back to 
haunt us. First, the United States must rely on Myanmar's neighbors to 
effect change—the same neighbors that have supported the military 
regime in the past. Ten years of U.S. unilateral sanctions have depleted our 
already minimal political and economic leverage over the regime and 
alienated some of our allies in the region. Myanmar’s neighbors have 
refused to join the sanctions in the past, and we may not be prepared to 
employ the leverage necessary for them to act on our behalf now. The idea 
that political stability in Myanmar will lead to better economic 
opportunities may not be incentive enough for Myanmar’s neighbors to 
encourage change.  
Second, it will be difficult to create a common position among 
Myanmar’s neighbors because their interaction with the Myanmar military 
regime is shaped by their specific economic and geopolitical interests. To 
create a common position among such diversity will require us to frame 
properly how we want them to use their influence. For example, it is 
highly unlikely that a common position grounded on regime change and 
promotion of democracy will ever be adopted by Myanmar's neighbors. 
However, a common plea to stem the violence and begin a dialogue as a 
first step may be more palatable. 
While the spirit of the Burmese people to rise up against tyranny has 
never wavered, the exact events that would follow a revolution have 
become a crucial issue. Before the next opportunity arises, the United 
States must work together with regional powers as well as stakeholders 
inside and outside the country to develop a vision of a free and prosperous 
Myanmar and pave the way for future political and economic reforms. The 
United States should be further prepared to reassess its failed sanctions-
only policy in light of recent events. A policy grounded in diplomacy and 
dialogue is much more likely to bring about a positive change in 
Myanmar. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:455 
 
 
 
 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi once urged the world to “use your liberty to 
promote ours.”255 At a critical moment when Burmese monks and students 
were willing to risk everything, we ought to have done more to answer her 
plea. By not doing enough, we have undermined ourselves and devalued 
the sacrifices of the monks and students who put their lives on the line to 
be free. Instead, the United States must lead the international community 
in empowering the Burmese people so that they may one day voice their 
convictions in unison, build a modern nation, and change their country for 
the better.  
 
 
 255. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Please Use Your Liberty to Promote Ours, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Feb. 4, 1997, at 8 (adapted by the International Herald Tribune from a commencement address by Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi to the American University in Washington, D.C., delivered on her behalf by her 
husband). 
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